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ABSTRACT 
United States Security Force Assistance (SFA) provided to partner nations (PN) 
enjoys varying degrees of success. The conduct of a PN government can have a 
tremendous impact on the success of SFA efforts and, although it is often 
ignored, is not beyond the capability of the U.S. to influence. Additional factors 
within U.S. control, such as the establishment of clear goals and objectives, as 
well as unity and continuity of effort, often do not receive adequate emphasis in 
SFA operations. The way U.S. advisors are selected, trained, and employed can 
also have a significant impact on the success of SFA operations. Although 
General Purpose Forces (GPF) have assumed a greater advisory role in recent 
years, the training they currently receive is not adequate to make them effective 
advisors.  
This thesis will show that, in order for U.S. SFA missions to be successful, 
such operations must: be based on clearly stated goals and objectives agreed 
upon by both the U.S. and the PN government, be contingent upon a PN 
government adhering to prescribed standards of conduct, and employ advisory 
personnel and units that have received specialized training in advisory duties. 
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Since the beginning of the Global War on Terror, the United States military 
has been called upon to perform traditional tasks at an unprecedented tempo, as 
well as performing many tasks, which it had not performed previously. The 
increasing emphasis on assisting partner nations to develop the capability and 
capacity to maintain their own security has led to an increase in both of the 
above categories. Providing assistance to partner nations is not a new task for 
the U.S. government or its military forces. Since World War II, even before the 
U.S. entered the war, the U.S. government provided significant assistance to 
allies in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. This assistance consisted of 
economic, technological, and military aspects. Assisting other nations in 
developing and maintaining their security forces, often involving the direct 
involvement of U.S. troops in combat, was a major component of U.S. strategy 
throughout the Cold War,1 motivated by the perceived necessity to prevent the 
spread of communism. Since the end of the Cold War—and especially since the 
beginning of the Global War on Terror—military assistance efforts have come to 
require increasing “boots on the ground” presence. However, as Secretary of 
Defense Robert M. Gates has acknowledged, “the U.S. military was designed to 
defeat other armies, navies, and air forces, not to advise, train, and equip them.”2 
However, due to increasing demands on the military forces of the United States, 
it is becoming increasingly important for the U.S. to assist its allies in developing 
the capability to be responsible for their own security.  
Assistance to partner nations is a U.S. national priority, rooted in strategy 
documents and supported by joint and service-specific military doctrine. A still 
evolving concept concerning building partnership capacity is Security Force 
Assistance (SFA), which is defined in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07, 
                                            
1 Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Help Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security 
Assistance,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3 (May/June 2010): 2. 
2 Ibid., 3. 
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Stability Operations, as “the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, 
host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. It 
improves the capacity of host-nation or regional security organizations’ security 
forces (collectively referred to as foreign security forces (FSF)).”3 Security Force 
Assistance “consists of organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising 
foreign security forces.”4 Although the U.S. has been conducting activities that fit 
this description for some time, the institutionalization of this term, and the priority 
it is receiving from the national to tactical levels, highlight the importance of SFA 
to the fulfillment of U.S. national objectives. 
A. THE BASIS FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE 
In order to adequately identify the characteristics of U.S. SFA efforts that 
determine success, it is necessary to understand how such efforts support U.S. 
national objectives. Because of the importance of these efforts, they are based 
not only in military doctrine, but foremost in national strategy. A series of strategy 
and policy documents, nested in our National Security Strategy (NSS), outline 
national priorities in different areas, as well as prescribing the means to achieve 
these ends. The NSS, the most recent version of which was published in May 
2010, is a broad overview of the priorities our leadership seeks to pursue to 
ensure the national security of the United States. Although some of these 
mechanisms can be influenced by the application of military force, the NSS 
includes several other means by which our national security can be preserved. 
Although the purpose of the NSS is to outline broad priorities that contribute to 
the overall security of the United States, its focus is not exclusively internal. For 
example, the section of the NSS that most relates to this study prescribes that we 
                                            
3 United States Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations 
(Washington, D.C., Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2008), 6–14.  
4 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, Commander’s Handbook for 
Security Force Assistance (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Joint Center for International Security 
Force Assistance, July 14, 2008), 3. 
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“Invest in the Capacity of Strong and Capable Partners”5 as a means to advance 
our national interests. There are several strategy documents nested in the NSS 
(including in the areas of Intelligence, Homeland Security, Combating Biological 
Threats, Countering Terrorism, etc.), but for the purposes of this discussion, the 
National Defense Strategy (NDS) and its supporting policies are more pertinent. 
The most recent version of the NDS, which was published in June 2008, 
outlines the objectives that will guide the Department of Defense in support of the 
National Security Strategy, as well as providing direction for the National Military 
Strategy (NMS).6 According to the 2008 NDS, “arguably the most important 
military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we 
do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern 
themselves.”7 In support of the NDS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff produce the 
National Military Strategy (NMS), the most recent version of which was published 
in 2004. The NMS supports the NDS by outlining how the military services will 
achieve the objectives prescribed in the National Defense Strategy. One of the 
concepts outlined in the NMS is Security Cooperation (SC), which consists of “All 
Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build 
defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied 
and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, 
and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host 
nation.”8 One of the components of Security Cooperation is Security Assistance 
(SA), which is “A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or 
other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, 
                                            
5 United States National Security Council, National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 2010), 26. 
6 National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004, 1. 
7 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, United States Department of 
Defense, June 2008, 8. 
8 United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Arlington, Virginia: United States Department of 
Defense, April 12, 2001 (amended through June 13, 2007), 480. 
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military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash 
sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.”9 It is important to note 
the mention of U.S. national interests, policies, and objectives in these two 
nested definitions.  
One of the DoD’s formal processes for assessing and reprioritizing how it 
will execute missions in support of national objectives is the Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR). As the 2006 QDR Report summarizes, “helping others 
to help themselves is critical to winning the long war,”10 and prescribes that 
General Purpose Forces (GPF) from all services develop the capability to “train, 
mentor and advise foreign security forces.”11 Secretary Gates reiterated this 
guidance, stating, “…advising and mentoring security forces is moving from the 
periphery of institutional priorities, where it was considered the province of the 
Special Forces, to being a key mission for the armed forces as a whole.”12 
Institutionalizing the QDR and Secretary Gates’ comments, U.S. Army Field 
Manual (FM) 3.07-1, Security Force Assistance, which integrates several themes 
from the 2006 QDR, states that conventional ground forces must “perform more 
of the tasks traditionally performed by special operations forces. Conventional 
forces must understand foreign cultures and societies, as well as be able to train, 
mentor, and advise FSF.”13 
B. CAPTURING SFA LESSONS LEARNED 
In 2006, then Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld directed 
the establishment of the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance 
(JCISFA). The mission of the JCISFA is to “capture and analyze security force 
                                            
9 United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 479. 
10 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Arlington, 
Virginia: United States Department of Defense, February 6, 2006), 11. 
11 Ibid., 42. 
12 Gates, “Helping Others Help Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance,” 3. 
13 United States Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07.1: Security Force Assistance 
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 1, 2009), 1–2. 
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assistance lessons from contemporary operations in order to advise combatant 
commands and Military Departments on appropriate doctrine, practices, and 
proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to prepare for and conduct 
security force assistance missions efficiently.”14 The JCISFA charter directed that 
the Secretary of the Army act as the Executive Agent for SFA, as well as 
prescribing that the Commander of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (a 
Lieutenant General) would be the JCISFA director, and would report through the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the SECDEF.15 The high rank of the 
JCISFA director, as well as his abbreviated reporting chain, are clear indications 
of the priority being given to SFA. Finally, Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 
3000.07, dated December 1, 2008, prescribes that the DoD will “train, advise, 
and assist foreign security forces and partners at the ministerial, service, and 
tactical levels to ensure security in their sovereign territory or to contribute forces 
to operations elsewhere.”16 Although it remains to be seen how the individual 
Service chiefs with implement this guidance, based on the emphasis being given 
to SFA efforts, and on improving our performance when conducting them, it is 
clear that SFA will be an enduring facet of U.S. operations for the foreseeable 
future.  
C. SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN INTERNAL 
DEFENSE 
The increased emphasis on performing advisory missions has required 
significant adjustments in U.S. military doctrine, and—perhaps more 
importantly—the training of our own forces to support these adjustments. The 
publication of U.S. Army FM (FM) 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance in May 2009 
established SFA as a core competency of the U.S. Army, and designated the 
                                            
14 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to Deputy Secretary of Defense et al. Subject: 
Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) Charter, April 4, 2006, 1. 
15 Ibid., 2. 
16 Ibid. 
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Modular Brigade Combat Team (BCT) as the Army’s cornerstone SFA unit.17 
However, BCTs will require augmentation and additional training prior to being 
deployed to conduct SFA missions, and will also be required to be trained and 
equipped for their more traditional doctrinal missions.18 Although FM 3-07.1 
acknowledges the necessity of Special Operations Forces (SOF) to participate in 
SFA, and discusses the integration of SOF and General Purpose Forces (GPF) 
in conducting SFA operations, it devotes only an appendix to their responsibilities 
in SFA.19 In practice, BCTs tasked with SFA missions have become the focal 
point of ongoing operations, especially in Iraq, in the form of “Advise and Assist 
Brigades.”20 Although this refers to the mission they are conducting, rather than 
to a change in force structure, SFA missions require “a different mind-set and 
focus” than missions to which BCTs are more accustomed.21 This paradigm shift 
has caused some consternation in both SOF (particularly Special Forces) and 
GPF circles, in part because of resistance to change—both because of the 
necessity for GPF to learn new skills, and because of the perception that they are 
actually being asked to conduct Foreign Internal Defense (FID), thus encroaching 
on a mission traditionally reserved for SOF. In practice, however, FID and SFA 
are more closely related than prevailing opinions may make them seem. 
1. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) Defined 
Despite the priority Security Force Assistance is receiving from U.S. 
government and military organizations, it is still often confused with FID. FID, 
which has traditionally been the province of SOF (and in particular, U.S. Army 
Special Forces (SF), also known as ‘the Green Berets’), is defined as 
                                            
17 United States Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07.1: Security Force Assistance 
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 1, 2009), 4–1. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid, ii. 
20 Gates, “Helping Others Help Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Force Assistance,” 
3. 
21 Philip Battaglia and Curtis Taylor, “Security Force Assistance Operations: Defining the 
Advise and Assist Brigade,” Military Review (July–August 2010): 4. 
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“participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the 
action programs taken by another government or designated organization to free 
and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”22 Notably 
absent from this definition is any reference to external threats; as the name 
implies, FID is an inwardly focused program. FID is conducted by U.S. military 
forces and government organizations, in support of a partner nation’s Internal 
Defense and Development (IDAD) program, which encompasses “the full range 
of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from 
subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building effective 
institutions (political, economic, military, and social) that respond to the needs of 
society.”23 Given the significant similarity between FID and SFA, it is easy to see 
how the two practices could be confused.  
2. Sources of the Confusion Between FID and SFA 
Despite the priority being placed on conventional (albeit augmented) BCTs 
by the Army, the Department of Defense recently designated USSOCOM as the 
joint SFA proponent.24 Furthermore, the Army’s Combined Arms Center, which 
has been assigned Army proponency for Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, 
has assumed responsibility for SFA as well, and integrated it into the U.S. Army 
and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center,25 which arguably contributes to the 
confusion. Although the U.S.’s two most visible ongoing operations—Operation 
Enduring Freedom and Operation New Dawn (formerly Operation Iraqi 
                                            
22 United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Arlington, Virginia: United States Department of 
Defense, April 12, 2001 (amended through June 13, 2007), 212. 
23 Ibid., 273. 
24 Theresa Baginski et al., A Comprehensive Approach to Improving U.S. Security Force 
Assistance Efforts (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, 
2009), 9.  
25 Counterinsurgency, Security Force Assistance, Stability Operations Website, United 
States Army Combined Arms Center, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/index.asp. 
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Freedom)26—involve conducting SFA in COIN environments, fighting an 
insurgency is not a precondition for SFA (and is in fact a more common feature of 
FID missions). This disparity in doctrinal responsibility, as well as the 
presumptive connection between COIN and SFA, is arguably one of the reasons 
for the confusion about what differentiates SFA from FID. The similarity between 
FID and SFA, as well as the fact that both types of missions are being conducted 
simultaneously in both Afghanistan and Iraq, has fueled the debate over whether 
GPF are simply now being tasked with conducting FID, which has traditionally—
but not exclusively—been a SOF mission. This confusion is so pervasive that FID 
and SFA are often used interchangeably, even in professional literature. 
Although there is currently no formal joint definition of SFA, the Army 
definition above focuses on the legitimate authority receiving assistance, rather 
than on the potential threats—internal or external—that this authority may face. 
Therefore, when analyzing these two definitions, it seems that FID is actually a 
subset of SFA, which specifically addresses internal threats, including 
insurgencies. The Department of Defense publishes the Irregular Warfare Joint 
Operating Concept (IW JOC) to outline how it visualizes the joint force operating 
to counter irregular threats in the future.27 According to the most recent version 
of this document, published in 2010, “FID occurs in the context of an internal 
threat, whereas SFA may be provided or conducted as part of peacetime 
engagement or in response to an external threat.”28 Based on that definition, it is 
more accurate to say that SF units are conducting a specific type of SFA when 
they engage foreign military forces through activities, such as Joint Combined 
Exercise Training (JCETs), which are “programs conducted overseas to fulfill 
U.S. forces training requirements and at the same time exchange the sharing of 
                                            
26 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to Commander, U.S. Central Command. Subject: 
Request to Change the Name of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM to Operation NEW DAWN, dated 
February 17, 2010. 
27 United States Department of Defense, Joint Operating Concept for Irregular Warfare: 
Countering Irregular Threats (Version 2.0) (United States Department of Defense, May 17, 2010), 
8. 
28 Ibid., 20. 
 9
skills between U.S. forces and host nation counterparts.”29 However, the 2010 
IW JOC expands on the definition of FID it provides by describing it as “a long-
term effort that requires persistent rather than episodic engagement” that “should 
be a multi-year program of synchronized civilian and military activities and 
engagements.”30 However, the characteristics listed in this description seem to 
describe SFA more so than FID.  
Both FID and SFA may be conducted across the full spectrum of military 
operations, from stable peace to general war. The key difference between FID 
and SFA is that FID is concerned mainly with internal threats, while SFA focuses 
on both internal and external threats. Furthermore, as our current operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate, although FID and SFA differ in their focus, they 
can occur simultaneously. In each of those operations, U.S. military forces (along 
with forces from other NATO member countries) are currently training security 
forces, which are responsible for internal security (such as police), as well as 
military forces, which will someday be responsible to protect their respective 
countries from potential external threats. The differences between FID and SFA 
are based on the consumers and objectives of the assistance provided, not on 
the type of U.S. forces used to provide it. Despite the differing focuses of FID and 
SFA, some believe that SFA is a task best performed by Special Forces, based 
on their competence and experience in conducting FID.  
3. Assigning Responsibility for SFA 
Although SOF are required by law to conduct FID,31 and are the forces 
most closely associated with it, there is no legal requirement that they be the only 
forces who do so. In fact, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report 
prescribes that GPF from all services develop the capability to “train, mentor and 
                                            
29 United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05: Doctrine for Special 
Operations (Arlington, Virginia: United States Department of Defense, December 17, 2003), G–7. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. 
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advise foreign security forces,”32 guidance which received even greater 
emphasis in the 2010 QDR Report.33 Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense, states, “Although 
USSOCOM is legislatively-mandated to conduct FID, which it does as a core 
task, other designated DoD conventional forces may contain and employ organic 
capabilities to conduct limited FID indirect support, direct support, and combat 
operations.”34  
Because SFA is a fairly new and still evolving concept, several different 
theories exist regarding what conditions dictate SOF or GPF primacy in SFA 
missions. Regardless of the arguments for assigning responsibility for SFA to 
SOF units, the U.S. simply does not possess enough SOF assets to fulfill our 
current U.S. SFA requirements, much less any new requirements that may 
emerge. According to U.S. Army FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, the first edition of 
which was published in December 2006, “while SOF personnel may be ideal for 
some training and advisory roles, limited numbers restrict their ability to carry out 
large-scale missions to develop [host nation] security forces.”35 In response to 
this scarcity, FM 3-24 assigns responsibility thusly: “while FID has traditionally 
been the primary responsibility of the special operations forces (SOF), training 
foreign forces is now a core competency of regular and reserve units of all 
Services.”36 This guidance directly supports the priorities outlined in the 2006 
QDR Report.37 Furthermore, while FM 3-24 and the QDR established FID as a 
                                            
32 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Arlington, 
Virginia: United States Department of Defense, February 6, 2006), 42. 
33 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Arlington, 
Virginia: United States Department of Defense, 2010), 29. 
34 United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07.1: Joint Tactics, Techniques, 
and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (Arlington, Virginia: United States Department of 
Defense, April 30, 2004), V–4. 
35 United States Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency 
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006), 6–3. 
36 Ibid. 
37 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Arlington, 
Virginia: United States Department of Defense, February 6, 2006), 23. 
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doctrinal responsibility of each of the services, the development of capabilities to 
conduct FID is still lagging behind doctrine (a phenomenon that is not 
uncommon). However, although recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
made it clear that advisory missions cannot remain the exclusive province of 
SOF, it would be an error to assign advisory missions to GPF based solely on the 
lack of available SOF units to accomplish the mission. 
a. The Influence of ‘Size’ on SFA Mission Assignment  
Although the sheer scope of ongoing U.S. efforts to assist in the 
development of Afghan and Iraqi security forces, as well as long-standing steady-
state advisory efforts, have brought to light the need for GPF to serve as the 
main effort in SFA—at least under certain conditions. However, there is concern 
that this realization is a function of the scarcity of SOF relative to numerical 
mission requirements, rather than the core competencies and skill sets required 
for such missions. It important that leaders do not use merely the size of an SFA 
mission to determine the type of forces should be employed for it. The critical skill 
sets and expertise that are required to accomplish the mission (and to further 
U.S. goals while providing relevant training to the partner nation’s forces) have 
far more influence on success than the type of units employed.38 However, even 
some of the Army’s senior leaders have reversed these factors. In late 2007, 
Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, then Senior Military Advisor to the 
SECDEF, wrote, “we should ensure our conventional forces have the inherent 
flexibility to transition to ISF support when the mission becomes too large for the 
Special Forces. If requirements exceed Special Forces capabilities, then training 
and transition teams should be internally resourced from conventional U.S. or 
coalition units already operating in the battlespace.”39 Unfortunately, this 
reasoning focuses solely on physical requirements, and ignores the role 
                                            
38 John Mulbury, “ARSOF, General Purpose Forces, and FID: Who Does What, Where, and 
When?,” Special Warfare 21, no. 1 (January–February 2008): 18.  
39 Peter W. Chiarelli and Stephen M. Smith, “Learning from Our Modern Wars: The 
Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future,” Military Review (September–October 2007): 8. 
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competency must play in assigning responsibility for SFA missions. The 
assignment of responsibility for SFA missions should be based on the skills 
required for success, as well as the political and operational conditions under 
which these missions must be undertaken, rather than on numerical 
requirements.  
Although SFA and FID are closely related concepts, they are not 
synonymous. The key distinction between SFA and FID is a function of focus, 
and of the conditions under which each type of mission is conducted. The 
determination of whether an advisory effort is best classified as SFA or FID does 
not depend on what type of units are employed to conduct these missions, or on 
the scope of the requirements they entail. The association of SOF—particularly 
SF units, with the low signature and unique skill sets for which they are known—
with FID, and a lack of clarity concerning SFA, continues to contribute to a 
certain level of confusion, even among senior military leaders. Although SFA is a 
more recently established term than FID, based on their doctrinal definitions, FID 
is actually a specific type of SFA operation. 
Inherent to any discussion about what type of forces are best suited 
to perform SFA missions is an underlying debate about what qualities and 
capabilities are necessary for an advisor to be successful. Special Operations 
Forces—particularly Special Forces personnel—are uniquely qualified to interact 
with foreign security forces under a wide range of operational and political 
conditions. However, General Purposes Forces—due in large part to their 
numerical superiority to SOF—will be required to participate in SFA operations 
for the foreseeable future, despite the disparity that currently exists between their 
traditional skill sets and those required for successful advisory and assistance 
missions. Given this disparity, it is clear that measures must be taken to 
adequately prepare GPF to conduct SFA missions, while maintaining 
competence in their doctrinal missions. However, the best way to achieve this—
at the individual and organizational levels—is currently the subject of much 
debate. 
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D. FUTURE SFA REQUIREMENTS 
Although the specific projections for SFA requirements submitted by 
geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) is classified, it is inadvisable to 
expect that SFA requirements will be unnecessary after the current missions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have been completed. Furthermore, despite the long 
duration and resource-intensive nature of U.S. efforts to assist the Afghan and 
Iraqi governments to improve the capabilities and capacity of their security 
forces, it is important to note that U.S. assistance to its allies is actually more 
effective if it is conducted during Shaping Operations,40 and is therefore, 
preventative in nature.41 The preventative nature of assisting our partner nations 
was reiterated in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), which prescribes 
investing in capable partners as a means to “Prevent the Emergence of 
Conflict.”42 Failing to provide proper assistance to partner nation forces during 
peacetime may result in the necessity to do so (and perhaps to actually 
participate in combat operations) during periods of conflict. Although the 
governments of Afghanistan and Iraq were not allies of the U.S. prior to our 
intervention in those countries, it had become obvious that U.S. assistance 
efforts required increased emphasis, in order to decrease the potential burdens 
on our military forces.  
Although the U.S. government maintains long-standing assistance 
relationships with several countries around the world, this assistance (e.g., direct 
funding or Foreign Military Sales (FMS)) is often transparent to the indigenous 
population. However, in instances where U.S. assistance is more overt (i.e., 
                                            
40 United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (Arlington, 
Virginia: United States Department of Defense, September 17, 2006 (Incorporating Change 1, 
February 13, 2008), IV–27—IV–28. “Shaping Operations” involve joint and multinational 
operations – inclusive of normal and routine military activities—and various interagency activities 
that are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify 
relationships with friends and allies.  
41 David Maxwell, “Considerations for Organizing and Preparing for Security Force 
Assistance Operations,” Small Wars Journal, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/03/security-
force-assistance-oper-1/. 
42 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, May 2010, 27. 
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requiring the presence of U.S. military forces), it becomes far more evident to the 
population, and can have a far greater impact—positive or negative—on the level 
of legitimacy the partner nation government enjoys in the eyes of the public. In 
any U.S. advisory effort, a high priority is placed on ensuring that operations are 
conducted with a partner nation “face” on them. Indeed, official guidance to that 
effect is often published. However, there is a far greater purpose to ensuring that 
partner nation forces are “in the lead” on operations. As advisory missions 
continue, and partner nation competency improves, the level of responsibility 
should shift from U.S. forces to partner nation forces, and U.S. forces should shift 
their focus from “training” to “advising.” Partner nations, therefore, must be 
afforded opportunities to improve their capabilities, which they cannot do without 
exercising them at increasing levels of independence. 
Many U.S. assistance efforts—including the current efforts in Afghanistan 
and Iraq—rely on contribution from our allies. As further evidence of the 
importance of our continued engagement with partner nations and their militaries, 
Admiral James Stavridis, Commander and U.S. European Command and 
Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, stated, “foreign military training is the 
most important long-term activity our military undertakes in terms of delivering 
security in this century.”43 Furthermore, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
designated Building Partnership Capacity and Security Force Assistance as 
special areas of emphasis in Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) for 
academic year 2010-2011,44 showing the criticality of emerging military leaders 
becoming well versed in SFA principles.  
                                            
43 Kevin Baron, “Pentagon Sees Training Allies As Its Greatest Hope,” Stars and Stripes, 
July 30, 2010, http://www.stripes.com/news/pentagon-sees-training-allies-as-its-greatest-hope-
1.112875. 
44 Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 
et al. Subject: 2010 Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Special Areas of Emphasis 
(SAE), May 17, 2010. 
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E. FOCUS AND SCOPE OF INQUIRY 
Although there is no universal template that can be applied to all SFA 
efforts, this study will seek to identify the strategic decisions, partner nation 
conditions, and best advisory practices employed in past and ongoing U.S. SFA 
efforts. Based on the positive or negative results yielded by these, it will 
recommend ways to maximize the former while mitigating the latter in future SFA 
efforts, and possibly in our continuing engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Although U.S. assistance to Afghanistan and Iraq has been underway for several 
years, both operations continue to offer opportunities to improve our practices, in 
pursuit of more positive and enduring results. This thesis will draw parallels 
between U.S. assistance to El Salvador in the 1980s and 1990s and the ongoing 
efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and will identify positive and negative aspects of 
each operation in order to recommend methods that may be used to influence 
the success of future SFA operations. 
Despite the obvious contribution to U.S. national priorities that SFA 
activities make, and the strategy and policy documents that highlight its 
importance in building the capability and capacity of partner nations, there is still 
a lack of clear doctrinal guidance describing the best practices for conducting 
SFA. Although SFA as it is now defined is still an immature (and indeed still 
evolving) concept, the U.S. has undertaken operations exhibiting the key SFA 
characteristics several times in the past. This work will therefore consider U.S. 
SFA efforts in El Salvador, as well as ongoing SFA efforts in Afghanistan and the 
Philippines, as case studies. In his comparison of U.S. assistance to Korea, 
Vietnam, and El Salvador, Ramsey asserts, “Each of these conflicts is significantly 
different, yet the challenge confronted by the advisors—how to establish an effective 
working relationship with their counterparts to improve the host nation military 
effectiveness in addressing its security problems—was the same.”45 The same 
comparison can be extended to current assistance to Afghanistan and Iraq. 
                                            
45 Robert D. Ramsey, III. Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, 
and El Salvador (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 2. 
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Although SFA efforts usually include the various security forces of a 
partner nation—including military forces and police—this study will focus 
primarily on the military aspects of SFA. However, many of the countries to which 
we provide SFA do not employ the same template—that is, a clear separation 
between military forces and law enforcement organizations—as the United 
States. For example, many countries have (or desire to establish, with U.S. 
assistance) a national police force, for which there is no clear U.S. corollary.46 
However, despite the lack of a direct corollary within our military, or even within 
the U.S., our military forces—because they possess many of the skills a partner 
nation may wish to develop in a given security force—may be required to assist 
in developing these forces. Although the training of the police forces in Iraq has 
in large part been tasked to civilian law enforcement personnel and 
organizations, and the training, which has been performed by military personnel, 
has generally been tasked to military police organizations, there are examples of 
military forces assisting in the establishment of law enforcement organizations. 
For example, U.S. Special Forces units are currently being used to train Afghan 
National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) units, as well as local militias in several 
areas under the “Village Stabilization Program.”47 There are several other 
examples of there not being a clear distinction between military, paramilitary, and 
law enforcement functions in partner nations, where we can expect to conduct 
SFA missions in the future. This study will therefore approach SFA partnerships 
not from a “consumer” perspective, but from a U.S. perspective.  
It is extremely unlikely that an oppressive regime would request Security 
Force Assistance from the U.S., or any other external actor. Such a regime would 
most likely not enjoy the voluntary support of the indigenous population, much 
less the U.S. government, and any U.S. military involvement would most likely be 
                                            
46 United States Department of Defense, Joint Operating Concept for Irregular Warfare: 
Countering Irregular Threats (Version 2.0) (United States Department of Defense, May 17, 2010), 
32. 
47 Andrew Feickert, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for 
Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 16, 2010), 9. 
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in the form of Special Operations Forces conducting Unconventional Warfare 
(UW), which differs from SFA in that it centers on working with irregular forces, 
rather than a host nation’s conventional forces.48 More importantly, although the 
U.S. has a history of providing humanitarian aid even to totalitarian regimes (e.g., 
North Korea), if such a regime requested security assistance from the U.S., it 
would most likely not be forthcoming. This study will therefore consider only 
those instances in which a partner nation has requested—or at least consented 
to—U.S. assistance, with respect to both historical research and future 
application.  
United States interaction with partner nations is increasingly being 
conducted through a “whole of government” approach. However, this work will 
focus primarily on the factors influencing SFA that are within the purview of 
military decision makers (within the context of their role as agents of the U.S. 
government; their decisions will be assumed to support overall U.S. government 
objectives). If external influences had (or are having) a significant positive or 
negative impact on the military aspects of the SFA operations discussed herein, 
they will be examined. Furthermore, although each of the Services contributes to 
advisory efforts, the focus of this work will generally be on the U.S. Army’s role in 
SFA. More specifically, it will examine conditions under which U.S. Army Special 
Forces (SF) and GPF are being employed in SFA roles, with the goal of 
identifying conditions that best determine which type of force is best suited to a 
particular SFA mission. 
Another factor that must be considered in any study of U.S. security force 
assistance effort is the context under which the effort is undertaken, and the 
objectives that are established as a result. The U.S. participates in several 
persistent, “steady state” assistance relationships, which usually involve 
providing some type of military assistance under generally permissive conditions. 
                                            
48 United States Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-05.130: Army Special Operations 
Forces Unconventional Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
September 2008), 1–2. 
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However, SFA operations, like the ongoing efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, which 
were initiated after the cessation of major combat operations (MCO) and regime 
changes in those countries (and conducted during periods of extended conflict 
short of MCO), are more resource intensive, politically sensitive, and potentially 
dangerous. It is for this type of environment that we must prepare our forces, and 
therefore, it is operations, such as these, that merit continued study. Although we 
would prefer to successfully assist partner nations in shaping the environment so 
that our assistance could be provided in more hospitable conditions, we cannot 
take as given that this will be possible. We must, therefore, prepare not for this 
war, but for the next, but we can only do so by examining recent and current 
operations, and determining how we can improve our operations in the future. 
 19
II. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR, 1980–1992 
The assistance provided to El Salvador by the United States in the 1980s 
and 1990s is an example of a U.S. assistance effort that lends itself to 
examination on several levels. The strategic basis for U.S. involvement, 
conditions placed on continuing assistance, the impact of advisory characteristics 
at the individual and organizational levels, and the conditions within El Salvador 
prior to and throughout U.S. assistance had a significant effect on the success of 
the U.S. assistance efforts. 
The assistance provided by the U.S. to El Salvador was successful for 
several reasons. Although there were certainly challenges that affected the 
efficacy of this assistance effort, the methods employed by the U.S. government 
and its advisors contributed to increasing the competence of El Salvador’s 
military forces and government, and ultimately to El Salvador’s ability to defeat 
an insurgency. By assessing the status and requirements of El Salvador’s 
military forces, placing strict limits on advisory presence, screening advisors for 
specific qualifications, and establishing and enforcing standards of conduct for 
the El Salvadoran government and military, the U.S. successfully assisted El 
Salvador in achieving its security goals. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Despite a military coup in 1979,49 the El Salvadoran Armed Forces 
(ESAF) was lacking in training, equipment, discipline, and professionalism, and 
was operating more as a widely dispersed militia than the professional military of 
a sovereign nation.50 By late 1980, the Government of El Salvador (GOES) found 
itself facing a growing communist insurgency, led by the Farabundo Marti 
                                            
49 Robert D. Ramsey, III, Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, 
and El Salvador (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 83. 
50 Andrew J. Bacevich, American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador 
(Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 1988), 24. 
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National Liberation Front (FMLN), which rapidly evolved into a civil war.51 Still 
reeling from the failures of Vietnam, the U.S. government was reluctant to risk 
becoming involved in another protracted conflict on foreign soil. However, in 
order to maintain regional stability in Latin America, and to prevent the spread of 
communism in the western hemisphere, it was in the U.S.’s strategic interests to 
assist the GOES in defeating the growing insurgency and restoring stability in El 
Salvador. Initially, the U.S. elected only to reinstate economic aid to El Salvador, 
to offset the support the insurgency was receiving from Cuba and the Soviet 
Union,52 but the ineffectiveness of the ESAF soon made it evident that more 
direct assistance was necessary.53  
B. THE BASIS AND CONDITIONS FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE 
One of the main discriminators between the U.S. advisory effort in El 
Salvador and many other such efforts (including ongoing efforts in Afghanistan 
and Iraq) is that it was based on a clearly defined strategy that had been agreed 
upon by both governments.54 U.S. assistance to El Salvador had the advantage 
of a unique foundation, in the form of a National Campaign Plan (NCP), which 
outlined clear objectives for the GOES, the ESAF, and the U.S. forces advising 
them. Although it was not published until 1983,55 the NCP addressed not only 
how the application of military force could contribute to winning the war, but how 
El Salvador’s government and civilian institutions could do so as well,56 reflecting 
the “whole of government” approach, which is necessary for any assistance 
mission (especially one being conducted in support of COIN) to succeed. The 
                                            
51 James S. Corum, “The Air War in El Salvador,” Airpower Journal (Summer 1998): 27. 
52 Building Peace and Democracy in El Salvador: An Ongoing Challenge (Ottawa, Ontario, 
Canada: Canadian Foundation for the Americas, February 18, 2000), 2. 
53 Ramsey, “Advising Indigenous Forces,” 84. 
54 Corum, “The Air War in El Salvador,” 30. 
55 Bacevich, American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador, 21. 
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 21
cornerstones of U.S. military assistance to El Salvador were Operations, Plans 
and Training Teams (OPATTs), which were established at the brigade level.57 
One of the most important aspects of U.S. aid to El Salvador is that it was 
contingent upon the actions of the Salvadoran military, and indeed the 
Salvadoran government as a whole. Although it was in the strategic interests of 
the United States to support El Salvador in defeating the insurgency with which it 
was faced, there were several issues—most notably the El Salvadoran 
government’s record of human rights abuses—that made close U.S. monitoring 
of Salvadoran actions prudent, if not necessary. The U.S. government therefore 
had to find a way to influence the actions of the El Salvadoran government and 
improve the competence of its military, while also protecting its own national 
interests. Making continued U.S. assistance contingent upon the GOES 
improving its performance with respect to human rights was necessary for the 
U.S. to maintain its own legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. 
Furthermore, the U.S. government did not shrink from acknowledging El 
Salvador’s problems, or from communicating their relationship to continued U.S. 
aid. In fact, President George H. W. Bush visited El Salvador personally, to 
communicate to the GOES the necessity of eliminating human rights abuses if 
they desired continued assistance.58 As a result, although U.S. advisors were in 
El Salvador to help the ESAF to become a more competent, effective, and 
professional military, they had the additional responsibility of monitoring the 
ESAF’s conduct and reporting on any issues that could undermine U.S. 
government interests, especially those related to human rights.59 However, while 
this use of OPATTs as de facto “compliance officers” may have enhanced the 
perceived legitimacy of U.S. assistance to El Salvador in the international 
community, it may have actually harmed the effort at the tactical level.  
                                            
57 Cecil E. Bailey, “OPATT: The U.S. Army SF Advisors in El Salvador,” Special Warfare 17, 
no. 2 (December 2004): 18. 
58 Ramsey, Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El 
Salvador, 86. 
59 Ibid., 96. 
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C. ADVISORY CONSIDERATIONS IN EL SALVADOR 
Initial U.S. military assistance to El Salvador was limited to a small group 
of officers from the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) advising the ESAF 
general staff. Although the stated purpose of this team, which was led by General 
Fred E. Woerner, was to assist the GOES in developing their national military 
strategy, another equally important task was to conduct an assessment of 
internal conditions within the ESAF, and to determine the objectives of U.S. 
assistance before large-scale advisory efforts were initiated.60 The “Woerner 
Report,” as this assessment came to be known,61 is somewhat unique, because 
it was completed under conditions where U.S. forces were not actively involved 
in combat. Assessments, such as these, were not possible in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, since U.S. forces were tasked with training and advising those partner 
nations after they were already engaged in combat operations. It was not long 
before it became clear that, in order for the ESAF to reverse the influence of the 
insurgency before it had become too strong to counteract, it was necessary to 
increase not only the size, but more importantly the competence and 
professionalism of the ESAF in a short period of time.62  
In an effort to avoid repeating the ever-increasing advisory presence 
(which eventually grew into a major commitment of maneuver divisions) that 
characterized U.S. assistance to South Vietnam in the 1960s, the U.S. Congress 
imposed a strict limit on the advisory presence in El Salvador. Only 55 military 
personnel (officially designated as “trainers”)63 could be assigned to the U.S. 
Military Group (MILGROUP) in El Salvador at any given time.64 Although the 
number of U.S. troops in El Salvador actually reached 150, as a result of 
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personnel being attached to the MILGROUP on a temporary basis,65 even this 
number is incredibly low, given the size of the staffs they were charged to train 
and develop. Furthermore, U.S. advisors were charged not only with improving 
the tactical competence of the ESAF, but also with improving the efficiency of 
other disciplines like maintenance, logistics, and other support functions.66  
The limitations placed on the level of actual U.S. participation in El 
Salvador (most notably the limit of 55 military trainers/advisors) satisfied all U.S. 
government stakeholders. This limitation also satisfied the El Salvadoran 
government (and most, though not all, of its military leaders), because such a 
small U.S. presence ensured that they would maintain control over military 
operations. Nonetheless, although some ESAF brigade commanders accepted 
U.S. assistance, many of them viewed the presence of U.S. advisors in their 
units as an intrusion, because they believed their competence (and by extension, 
their authority), was being questioned.67 Furthermore, some of the Salvadoran 
officers objected to being advised by a U.S. officer of equal—or even senior—
rank.68 On MiTTs currently employed in Iraq, the team leaders are generally at 
least one rank below the commander they advise. Therefore, majors (and 
sometimes captains) typically lead battalion MiTTs, lieutenant colonels lead 
brigade MiTTs, and colonels lead division MiTTs. Although there are other 
factors that may contribute to this practice, including the limited availability of 
U.S. officers of appropriate rank, seniority, and experience, it has the additional 
effect of being less threatening to partner nation counterparts. However, it may 
also result in less effective advisory efforts. By 1985, OPATTs in El Salvador 
were led by combat arms majors, instead of lieutenant colonels, to diffuse the 
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issue of rank.69 Although the rank structure of MiTTs currently operating in Iraq 
and Afghanistan was designed to prevent this issue from arising, the sheer 
number of MiTTs in operation represents a significant drain on combat arms 
officers that could otherwise be employed in more conventional roles.  
The numerical limitation on advisors in El Salvador made it necessary for 
the MILGROUP to develop alternate methods of training ESAF units. One 
specialized ESAF infantry battalion, or BIRI, was actually trained at Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina. Perhaps because of the location of the training, a cadre of 180 
personnel was eventually used to train this one battalion, at a prohibitive cost of 
$8 million. This high cost-training model, as well as the lofty goals for ESAF 
expansion, made it necessary to train new units locally. However, the operational 
tempo and conditions within El Salvador made it desirable to establish a training 
facility outside the country, so the Regional Military Training Center in Honduras 
was established.70  
On an individual level, many of the officers and non-commissioned officers 
who served on OPATTs served multiple tours in El Salvador before and during 
the civil war. This was largely the result of having a small pool of qualified 
personnel from which to choose. Since the 7th Special Forces Group was 
already training elements of the ESAF prior to the outbreak of war, it was natural 
for personnel from that unit to form the foundation of the increased assistance 
effort. However, a greater pool of candidates was needed, so officers with 
previous SF experience who had returned to their basic branches were sought 
out for OPATT assignments as well. Although SF did not become a distinct 
branch until 1987,71 many of the officers chosen for OPATT assignments were 
SF qualified, and most of them had previous experience in El Salvador. 
Furthermore, many of the non-SF officers selected for OPATT assignments were 
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combat arms officers who had previously served in the 7th SF Group, and were 
therefore requested by name to serve on OPATTs. However, combat arms 
officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) without SF experience also 
served on OPATTs. The desired (but not required) qualifications for an OPATT 
assignment included previous experience in El Salvador, experience on a 
battalion or higher staff, and the ability to speak Spanish well.72 
D. ADVISORY CHALLENGES IN EL SALVADOR 
Unlike the conditions under which we are currently conducting SFA 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, where we are not only assisting, but 
establishing military forces under conflict conditions, the U.S. advisors in El 
Salvador were tasked with assisting an established military (albeit one without 
recent combat experience),73 in improving its overall competency (with the 
exception of the five BIRIs, which were conceived and created under U.S. 
supervision).74 Although this would seem to be a more desirable situation than 
building military forces from scratch, it presented its own set of challenges. For 
instance, the ESAF already had a well-established institutional culture, which 
was quite dissimilar from the U.S. military’s culture. One manifestation of this 
cultural difference was the divide between officers and soldiers, which was a 
wide gulf in the ESAF. While one of the strengths of the U.S. military is the 
existence of a professional non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps, the ESAF 
(like many Latin American militaries) was composed of officers (who were 
generally privileged, and promoted as a matter of course, or as a result of 
political connections, rather than merit), and generally young, illiterate soldiers,  
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with no professional NCO corps.75 One reason for this lack of intermediate 
leadership was that the officer corps viewed NCOs as a threat to their authority 
and position.  
The MILGROUP’s principal mission was to transform the ESAF into a 
professional organization,76 and although the organization and culture of the 
ESAF did not match that of the U.S. military, U.S. advisors found it hard to resist 
the impulse to remake the ESAF in the image of the U.S. military. They therefore 
attempted to impose an NCO rank structure on the ESAF. Unfortunately, this 
attempt was unwelcome, and ultimately unsuccessful as a result of resistance 
from the officer corps. In a mutually supporting effort, the MILGROUP, believing 
that a change in the ethos of the officer corps would lead to acceptance of NCOs 
into the ESAF structure, began training what it hoped would be a new generation 
of ESAF officers. Additional officers were necessary to support the ESAF’s 
expansion, but to remove these officers from potentially negative influences; the 
new officers were trained outside of El Salvador. Ultimately, at least 500 ESAF 
officers received training in the U.S., or at the Regional Military Training Center in 
Honduras.77 Unfortunately, upon their return to El Salvador, these junior “gringo 
officers” were seen as outsiders and, succumbing to pressure from the more 
established senior ESAF officers, tended to abandon the lessons they had 
learned in training and subscribe to the same types of behavior.78 Although 
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were similar to the ethnic differences currently being encountered in the 
development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),79 which will be 
discussed in detail below. 
Another challenge faced by U.S. advisors in El Salvador came in the form 
of restrictions placed on them by the U.S. government. In order to avoid having to 
invoke the War Powers Resolution, U.S. advisors were prohibited from 
participating in combat operations with the ESAF.80 Advisors were officially 
considered to be “trainers,” because of the connotation that the duties of a trainer 
would not require him to accompany ESAF units in the field.81 Although the U.S. 
government deemed this restriction necessary to prevent the U.S. from being 
drawn into a full-blown war (another manifestation of post-Vietnam concerns), it 
had some negative consequences for the advisors themselves. Already viewed 
as “spies” by some ESAF brigade commanders, U.S. advisors believed that their 
credibility suffered as a result of this type of restriction. As a result, some 
advisors ignored the restriction, believing that the risk of being caught violating it 
was worth the rapport with their counterparts their participation yielded.82  
In contrast to Korea, where U.S. advisors assisted the Korean government 
in a generally conventional conflict,83 the GOES was conducting large-scale 
counterinsurgency operations. U.S. assistance to the GOES therefore more 
closely fits the definition of FID noted earlier, rather than SFA. The ESAF had 
long maintained an internal focus, due to instability within El Salvador’s borders. 
However, despite the prevalence of FID missions occurring in COIN 
environments, and the fact that El Salvador certainly fit that criteria, U.S. training 
and advice was influenced by the previous experience of the advisors, as well as 
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the institutional memory of the U.S. Army. After Vietnam, many of the U.S.’s 
military leaders (especially in the Army) had eschewed COIN doctrine, believing 
(or at least claiming to believe) that we would never again need to fight a war like 
Vietnam, and should therefore focus on regaining competency in maneuver 
warfare. This mindset manifested itself in U.S. assistance to El Salvador (as well 
as other allies), and resulted in the ESAF receiving training that may have been 
more applicable to a maneuver war , rather than a COIN environment.84 
Although this was useful in the early stages of the civil war, once it became more 
indirect in nature, this emphasis on conventional tactics may have contributed to 
the conflict being more protracted than if U.S. advisors had been more willing to 
embrace COIN doctrine themselves, and to pass it on to the ESAF. 
E. ADDITIONAL U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE ESAF 
Although U.S. Army advisors, particularly Special Forces personnel, were 
very successful in the professionalization of Salvadoran ground forces, they did 
not possess all of the capabilities necessary to address all of the ESAF’s training 
needs. Of particular importance was the Salvadoran Air Force (the Fuerza Aerea 
Salvadorena, or FAS), which represented one of the few ESAF capabilities for 
which the guerillas had no equivalent. At the beginning of the civil war, the FAS 
was arguably the most professional component of the ESAF.85 However, it was 
also the smallest component and, because of the prohibitive costs inherent to 
operating and maintaining aircraft, it rarely conducted exercises prior to the start 
of the insurgency, and was, therefore, forced to improve its proficiency while 
conducting actual combat operations against the guerillas.86 However, ESAF 
ground forces could not defeat the insurgency without air support, so it was 
critical to increase the competency of the FAS. Due to the limit of 55 advisors in 
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El Salvador, however, the U.S. Air Force was only allowed to provide five 
personnel to train the FAS in El Salvador. By the end of the war, the FAS had 
received nearly 25% of the $1 billion of military aid provided by the U.S. to El 
Salvador.87 Due to the importance of air power to the ESAF, other means of 
training had to be explored, including training several FAS personnel in the U.S., 
or at the Inter-American Air Force Academy (IAAFA) in Panama.88 A similar 
course of action, which will be discussed below, is currently being pursued to 
train Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) helicopter pilots, some of whom 
have received training in the U.S. 
F. THE RESULTS OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR 
By the early 1990s, the FMLN has lost much of its popular support, and 
was forced to enter into negotiations with the GOES, resulting in a formal peace 
agreement being signed on January 16, 1992.89 By the end of the Salvadoran 
civil war, U.S. assistance efforts had yielded significant, positive results, which 
benefited the governments of both El Salvador and the United States. On an 
operational level, the ESAF had grown not only in size, but in competence in 
several areas, while neutralizing a strong insurgency. With U.S. assistance, the 
ESAF increased in size from just over 10,000 to approximately 43,000,90 and had 
achieved a level of capability far beyond anything it had previously enjoyed. On a 
national level, the government of El Salvador attained a level of legitimacy—both 
internationally and internally—that it had never before enjoyed, and the U.S. had 
protected its own interests by ensuring that the conditions it placed on continued 
aid to the GOES were well-known, and closely monitored. Although the direct 
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impact of U.S. advisory efforts on El Salvadoran human rights practices is 
impossible to accurately measure, due to the possible influence of other factors 
(including the election of Jose Napoleon Duarte, a moderate reformer, to the 
office of the President),91 it is clear that much progress had been made in this 
area by the end of the civil war.92 The reduction in human rights abuses by the 
ESAF was most likely a product of training conducted by U.S. advisors both 
within and outside of El Salvador and the “conditionality of U.S. assistance,” 
although it is impossible to determine which of these was a more important 
factor.93 
G. SUMMARY 
Although U.S. assistance to El Salvador was not without problems, it 
provides an example of a long-term advisory presence that yielded observable 
positive results. The positive aspects of this effort were evident at the tactical, 
operational, and strategic levels. Despite the unwillingness of the ESAF officer 
corps to alter its patterns of behavior, or to accept a professional NCO corps, the 
significant increase in both the size and competence of the ESAF, which 
ultimately resulted in the neutralization of a strong insurgency, is clear evidence 
that a relatively small group of competent advisors—when supported by clear 
national policies and objectives—can have measurable effects on a partner 
nation’s security forces, even during periods of conflict.  
The repetition of advisory tours, and the preservation of expertise that it 
allowed, almost certainly contributed to the success of U.S. assistance to the 
ESAF. Although serving multiple tours of duty in the same theater, and even the 
same country, is not an uncommon occurrence (especially since the U.S. began 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq), the repetition of experience—especially 
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among conventional forces—is far more diffuse than it was during the U.S. 
advisory effort in El Salvador. Although many of the Special Forces personnel 
who worked with the ESAF worked with different brigades on subsequent tours of 
duty in El Salvador, their duties were typically the same as—or at least similar 
to—what they had been previously. Furthermore, even if these personnel 
advised a different ESAF brigade each time they returned to El Salvador, they 
retained the cultural sensitivity, geographical knowledge, and institutional savvy 
that they had accumulated on previous tours. Conversely, with respect to 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is not uncommon for GPF soldiers to 
transfer to different units, be promoted to different positions, or even change 
military occupational specialties (MOS) or career fields between deployments, 
resulting in a diffusion—rather than concentration—of experience.  
Perhaps the greatest difference between U.S. assistance to El Salvador 
and other assistance efforts (most notably Vietnam, but also the ongoing efforts 
in Afghanistan and Iraq) is not merely the unity of effort, but the continuity of 
effort that characterized it. Although the advisory effort in El Salvador evolved 
somewhat throughout the civil war, it was generally a focused effort. 
Furthermore, from its inception, U.S. assistance to El Salvador was undertaken 
with clear objectives, with respect to improving both the ESAF’s competence and 
the perception of El Salvador in the international community. U.S. assistance to 
El Salvador was based on a National Campaign Plan agreed upon by both the 
U.S. and Salvadoran governments. Furthermore, clear guidelines regarding U.S. 
assistance—as well as standards of acceptable conduct by both the ESAF and 
GOES—were established prior to the U.S. becoming fully engaged in such 
assistance. More importantly, the U.S. government—personified by President 
Bush himself—exhibited the will to enforce these standards.  
In contrast to U.S. assistance to El Salvador, our ongoing assistance to 
Afghanistan seems to lack both a clear, consistent strategy and the threat of 
negative consequences for the Afghanistan’s government or security forces 
failing to adhere to prescribed standards of conduct. Furthermore, the efforts to 
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develop Afghan (and, to a degree, Iraqi) security forces, which will be discussed 
in more detail below, have been anything but focused, instead being 
characterized by several different types of organizations with disparate missions 
being developed simultaneously. However, in Afghanistan, the U.S. was forced 
not only to provide military assistance, but to fully establish the Afghan National 
Army, if not the government itself, which has certainly contributed to this lack of 
clear focus.  
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III. U.S. SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN 
United States assistance to Afghanistan has been fraught with setbacks, 
at the tactical and operational levels, as well as the diplomatic level. Although 
many causes may have contributed to these setbacks, the lack of clear goals and 
objectives, a lack of continuity of effort, and the failure of the U.S. government to 
hold the Afghan government to explicit standards of conduct are certainly among 
them. Because the same criteria that were applied to El Salvador were not 
applied in Afghanistan, true unity of effort with respect to counterinsurgency 
operations and assistance to Afghanistan has never been achieved, and too 
many new security initiatives are being pursued without consideration of whether 
they help or harm the Afghan government’s ability to govern. Furthermore, the 
Afghan population, no longer willing to trust what they see as a corrupt 
government, is beginning to once again embrace the Taliban, especially in rural 
areas.  
A.  BACKGROUND 
Prior to the United States involvement in Afghanistan, which began in 
reaction to the September 11, 2001 attacks, the only group that could claim to 
providing governance and security in Afghanistan was the Taliban. However, the 
Taliban’s influence over the population was based not on providing services or 
protection, but on coercion. The Taliban rose to power in Afghanistan largely 
because they exhibited—in the midst of years of anarchy that followed the 
departure of Soviet forces from Afghanistan—the ability to establish and enforce 
order in much of the war-torn country. However, this sense of order came at the 
cost of a strict brand of justice that prescribed severe punishments for violations 
of the Taliban’s fundamental interpretation of Islam, which was enforced by their 
Department for the Propagation of Virtue and Suppression of Vice.94 The Afghan 
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population therefore had to endure despotic rule for a semblance of stability. 
Furthermore, the focus of the Taliban was purely internal. Although they were 
able to exert control over most of the Afghan population through fear and 
intimidation, the Taliban were incapable of protecting Afghanistan from external 
aggression. Largely because of the Taliban’s ignorance of human rights, the 
international community refused to recognize the Taliban as a legitimate 
government,95 and was therefore unlikely to assist in addressing threats, 
including those from Iran, Afghanistan’s neighbor to the west. Therefore, 
although the Taliban established order in Afghanistan, it never achieved many of 
the benchmarks to be considered—by the international community and by the 
Afghan population—a legitimate government. After the fall of the Taliban in 
November 2001, however, Afghanistan was left without a functioning 
government, creating a void that had to be filled quickly. The Bonn Agreement, 
which established an interim Afghan government, was therefore, passed in 
December 2001.96 
B. THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
Afghanistan is perhaps the most complex environments in which the U.S. 
has undertaken assistance operations since—and arguably including—Vietnam. 
Although nearly any environment to which U.S. troops are dispatched to provide 
assistance cane be described as “complex,” the operating environment in 
Afghanistan presents a large number of interacting variables that make it the 
most complex environment in which U.S. troops are currently operating. The 
Afghan population consists of several different ethnic groups and tribes (which 
are further divided into sub-tribes and clans),97 spread out throughout a country 
with little (and in many places no) infrastructure to connect them. As a result, 
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independent entities like shuras and jirgas are formed to address local issues. It 
is therefore difficult (and, in the eyes of many rural Afghans, unnecessary) to 
extend any centralized influence over many areas of Afghanistan, including the 
influence of government security forces.  
Another factor that has hindered U.S. prosecution of the war in 
Afghanistan, including the development of the Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF, which are composed of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan 
National Police (ANP)), is the necessity to operate as part (and the de facto 
leader) of a coalition.98 Although the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) is composed of forces from 48 nations, nearly two-thirds of the almost 
131,000 troops currently in Afghanistan are U.S. forces.99 However, despite the 
majority of ISAF being U.S. forces, and U.S. Army General David H. Petraeus 
being the ISAF commander, the U.S. does not enjoy complete independence 
with respect to decision making. Furthermore, although participation by several 
different countries has some benefits, it also creates challenges, especially with 
respect to unity of command. Although all international partner forces fall under 
ISAF command, they also have internal authorities to which they must answer, 
which may obscure lines of communication and operational priorities. 
Furthermore, many of the countries, which have contributed forces to ISAF, have 
done so on the condition that their forces are allowed to adhere to caveats and/or 
rules of engagement that restrict the activities they can be compelled to 
conduct.100  
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C. LEGITIMACY AND CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN 
Since early in the U.S.’s involvement in Afghanistan, the U.S. 
government—primarily through military means—has sought to assist the new 
Afghan government (known as the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, or GIRoA) to gain legitimacy not only in the eyes of the international 
community, but also in the hearts and minds of its own population. In contrast to 
El Salvador, where both the U.S. and Salvadoran governments acknowledged 
issues internal to El Salvador (e.g., human rights violations) that had the potential 
of undermining the effectiveness of U.S. involvement there, there seems to be a 
lack of acknowledgement of such problems in Afghanistan.101 Furthermore, as 
discussed earlier, the perceived legitimacy of a partner nation’s government in 
the eyes of its own population can have a significant effect on the legitimacy of 
U.S. forces that have been invited or welcomed by the host government. 
Therefore, the perceived legitimacy of the GIRoA and of U.S. forces are 
inextricably related. 
After the oppressive Taliban regime was removed from power, Hamid 
Karzai was appointed to serve as interim president of Afghanistan, and to lead its 
fledgling government.102 However, nearly nine years after they were removed 
from power, the Taliban is experiencing resurgence in popularity, at least partly 
because of questionable conduct by the GIRoA, ranging from mere 
incompetence to widespread corruption. Corruption is nothing new in 
Afghanistan, and a certain level of what most Westerners would consider 
corruption, in the form of the practice of “backsheesh,” which generally consists 
of small bribes in the course of business, is actually considered the norm 
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there.103 However, corruption in the GIRoA (including the ANSF) has reached a 
level that has created conditions favorable to the Taliban. Although the Taliban 
can sometimes be brutal, it has cultivated the image of an efficient, corruption-
free organization capable of resolving local issues in a timely manner, in sharp 
contrast to the prevalent perception of the GIRoA.104 Furthermore, recent events 
have begun to affect even the relationship between the U.S. and Afghan 
governments, to the point where the emphasis on addressing corruption may be 
undermining the U.S.’s focus on achieving its overall goals in Afghanistan.105  
Although corruption in the GIRoA has undoubtedly existed for some time, 
the Afghan presidential elections in August 2009, which were widely 
acknowledged to have been fraudulent,106 brought it to the attention of the 
American public, as well as the international community. Despite the negative 
attention caused by the 2009 election, the parliamentary elections held in 
September 2010 were also tainted by reports of widespread fraud, much of which 
has been attributed to the influence of Ahmed Wali Karzai, President Karzai’s 
brother and Provincial Governor of Kandahar.107 Indeed, in a system in which the 
president appoints the provincial governors,108 who in turn appoint subordinate 
district governors, it is not hard to see how favoritism and nepotism are prevalent. 
In addition to undermining the perceived legitimacy of an already suspect 
government in the eyes of its own constituents, the effect the corruption signified 
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by these elections may have on coalition partnerships remains to be seen. The 
U.S. is undoubtedly more invested in Afghanistan than any of the other NATO 
members currently contributing to operations there, so they are likely to lose 
patience with the GIRoA’s continued malfeasance more quickly than the U.S.  
Although the Salvadoran government negotiated with the FMLN to bring 
an end to hostilities only after the FMLN was at a significant disadvantage (and 
as a result of U.S. pressure to do so), it did so with the support of the population. 
In Afghanistan, however, negotiation is a fairly recent development, initiated by 
the GIRoA in response to a reinvigorated—rather than weakened—Taliban. 
Furthermore, popular support for these negotiations is anything but guaranteed. 
Throughout 2010, possibly in response to the inability of ISAF and Afghan forces 
to defeat the Taliban, Afghan President Hamid Karzai has made repeated 
overtures to the Taliban, in an effort to bring about an end to hostilities. However, 
these discussions have been informal, and in fact, Karzai did not acknowledge 
such efforts publicly until October 2010.109 President Karzai has also made more 
official efforts to achieve peace diplomatically. On September 4, 2010, Karzai 
announced the formation of the High Council for Peace, an effort to reintegrate 
former Taliban members (some of whom would be invited to be members of the 
council) into Afghan society. While the U.S. and its ISAF partners have voiced 
their support of the council, the Taliban denounced it, citing the presence of 
foreign troops in Afghanistan as evidence that the Afghan government is still 
“subordinate to the international community,” and therefore, any such measure is 
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even if it is a sincere gesture to bring about peace, may be alienating some of his 
supporters, and possibly undermining the legitimacy of the Afghan 
government.111 
One of the greatest external influences affecting the perceived legitimacy 
of the GIRoA is the mere presence of ISAF forces. After more than nine years in 
Afghanistan, and with troop numbers at their highest level ever, it is difficult to 
counter the perception of ISAF (and, as its most prominent member, the U.S.) as 
an occupying force. Although the GIRoA endorses (and openly acknowledges 
the necessity of) this presence, it is difficult to overcome the perception that the 
U.S. “installed” the new government, and therefore dictates the conditions of its 
continued presence. Despite constant claims to the contrary, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that the U.S. is involved in “armed nation building” in 
Afghanistan.112 In addition to providing assistance to Afghanistan, the U.S. has 
been attempting to apply the template of a democratic government where none 
has ever existed. The only times when previous Afghan governments were 
perceived by the Afghan population as legitimate were the result of dynastic or 
religious influences, or a combination of both. By assisting Afghanistan to 
conduct elections, the U.S. is therefore attempting to leverage the only 
mechanism for which there has been no prior success.113 As Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles admonished the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary in 1954, 
“Strong and stable governments and societies are necessary to support the 
creation of strong armies.”114 By any measure, the current situation in 
Afghanistan does not exhibit any of the variables in Dulles’ equation. 
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D. ADVISORY CONSIDERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN 
The ultimate goal of any FID or SFA effort is for the partner nation’s 
security forces to achieve the capability to take sole responsibility for the security 
of their own country. This is accomplished through a long-term program involving 
both training and advising. Ideally, as the competency of partner nation forces 
increases, emphasis will gradually shift from training to advising, until even 
advising is not required (although it may continue past this point). However, this 
is not necessarily a linear process; partner nation security forces (just like any 
U.S. military unit) may have to “backtrack” and conduct retraining in certain 
areas. In Afghanistan, however, (as well as in Iraq, which will be discussed later), 
the U.S. has created its own setbacks by continually adjusting the mechanisms 
by which it seeks to establish and develop Afghan-controlled security institutions. 
Furthermore, with the U.S. and its NATO partners focusing on combat operations 
in Afghanistan, sufficient priority was not placed on the development of the ANA 
for several years after assistance operations in Afghanistan began.115 
Since October 2009, the development of the ANSF has been the 
responsibility of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security 
Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A).116 The mission of the NTM-
A/CSTC-A, which includes personnel from the U.S. and thirteen additional 
coalition partners,117 is to “in coordination with key stakeholders, generate and 
sustain the ANSF, develop leaders, and establish enduring institutional capacity 
in order to enable accountable Afghan-led security.”118 This is accomplished 
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through advisors contributed by several of the NATO partner nations operating in 
Afghanistan. Although advisors are sometimes viewed as a military tool, in 
addition to providing assistance to the ANSF at the tactical level, military and 
civilian advisors from the NTM-A/CSTC-A also operate at the ministerial level, in 
both the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI),119 
which are responsible for the ANA and ANP, respectively. In addition to providing 
assistance to the ANSF, NTM-A/CSTC-A also tracks the development of the 
ANSF, based on input from advisors working with ANSF units. Although this input 
is collected according to prescribed formats, it still has a measure of inherent 
subjectivity, since it relies on input aggregated from the observations of advisors 
working with units under disparate conditions throughout Afghanistan. The most 
concrete measure of the ANSF’s progress is therefore the number of recruits or 
cohort units that complete training at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC). 
Although it is the most observable measurement of any military force, size 
does not equate to capability or competence. In fact, one could argue that, in the 
early phases of its development, there is an inverse relationship between the size 
of a force and its overall competence (which will likely become even more 
pronounced if numerical growth receives more emphasis than competence). The 
development of the ANSF must be considered a prerequisite to the withdrawal of 
NATO (and especially U.S.) troops from Afghanistan, but this development 
cannot be rushed, or we run the risk of leaving Afghanistan with security forces 
that are not adequately prepared, which would most likely require more U.S. 
assistance in the future. As Anthony H. Cordesman asserts in his report “Afghan 
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…such efforts must not race beyond either Afghan or 
US/NATO/ISAF capabilities. Quality will often be far more important 
than quantity, and enduring ANSF capability far more important 
than generating large initial force strengths. US/NATO/ISAF 
expediency cannot be allowed to put half-ready and unstable units 
in the field. It cannot be allowed to push force expansion efforts 
faster than ANSF elements can absorb them or the US/NATO/ISAF 
can provide fully qualified trainers, mentors, and partner units and 
the proper mix of equipment, facilities, enablers, and 
sustainability.120 
It is important to note that Cordesman emphasizes the role of “trainers, mentor, 
and partner units” in developing partner nation security forces. Unfortunately, as 
Cordesman points out, despite the renewed emphasis being placed on the 
development of ANSF, there is still a significant shortage of qualified advisors 
relative to the numerical requirements of the ANSF.121 If Cordesman’s assertion 
is correct, this relative shortage will only increase in the near term, due to 
increasing goals for ANSF growth. 
Throughout U.S./NATO involvement in Afghanistan, unity of effort has 
been a significant issue, especially with respect to the development of ANSF, as 
well as other entities that will be discussed below. Although this is not an unusual 
phenomenon in any coalition environment, the constantly changing structure and 
evolving goals for their growth, have had a detrimental effect on the development 
of the ANSF. In January 2010, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board 
(JCMB) announced an ambitious plan to increase the size of the ANA from 
around 97,000 (the estimated current strength at that time) to 171,600 by the end 
of 2011 (the original goal for the ANA was to field 134,000 trained soldiers by the 
end of 2011),122 and to increase the size of the Afghan National Police (ANP) 
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from 94,000 to 134,000 in the same timeframe.123 These increased size goals 
carry with them a significant monetary commitment. Even before these increases 
were announced, the U.S. had committed a significant amount of capital to the 
development of the ANSF. Through the passage of the fiscal year 2010 DoD 
Appropriations Act, the U.S. had already obligated $25.23 billion (representing 
nearly 50% of our total cumulative assistance to Afghanistan) to the Afghan 
Security Forces Fund.124 
While the ANSF growth objectives are being increased, they are actually 
facing a great deal of difficulty merely maintaining their current strength, due 
largely to unusually high attrition. Like any military force, the ANA has to absorb 
combat losses. However, the ANA typically experiences higher attrition from 
other causes. Approximately 12% of the ANA declines to re-enlist every year; 
although this may not be a cause for great concern, the desertion rate is nearly 
as high, at 10 percent. Combined with battlefield losses, the non-retention and 
desertion rates result in a 25% reduction in the ANA’s strength every year.125 It is 
easy to see how this trend has a negative effect on the ANA’s development, and 
therefore on the advisory mission in Afghanistan. President Karzai has openly 
considered resorting to conscription to address shortfalls in ANA manning. 
However, this option, which has not been endorsed by Minister of Defense 
Wardak,126 would most likely be very unpopular with Afghans, and may actually 
cause even higher desertion rates. 
Although the size of the ANSF is obviously an important factor in its ability 
to effectively provide security in Afghanistan, competence is clearly a more 
important consideration. However, regardless of how many ANSF personnel 
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successfully graduate from the KMTC, and how well trained they are, the 
performance of ANSF units as they conduct operations in the field is a far more 
important measure of overall effectiveness. Placing U.S. advisors—usually in 
small Embedded Training Teams (ETTs)—with ANSF units was not yielding 
tangible results (or perhaps just not yielded results quickly enough), so ISAF 
recently began employing “partnering” as a new method to develop the ANSF. In 
August 2009, the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) was established. Under this 
command, the Combined Team approach, which entails ANSF and ISAF forces 
operating as equal partners on a permanent basis, was established. Similar to 
how the Combined Forces Command operates in South Korea, “Afghan and 
Coalition forces plan, brief, rehearse, and fight together as embedded partners, 
constantly building operational effectiveness and security capacity.” This 
partnership applies to all major operations, including conventional and special 
operations, as well as to partnering staff officers at every echelon and, in order to 
build the capacity of the ANSF, places special emphasis on assessing their 
performance and conducting retraining.127 Although the partnering of ANSF and 
ISAF units appears to be yielding positive results, it took nearly seven years to be 
institutionalized, and it remains to be seen if it will be an enduring paradigm. 
E. ADVISORY CHALLENGES IN AFGHANISTAN 
Several challenges to the advisory effort in Afghanistan exist, some of 
which are not uncommon, but others, which are somewhat unique—if not by their 
mere existence, than by their severity—to Afghanistan. One of the greatest 
challenges inherent to establishing the ANSF as a viable collective entity is the 
ethnic divisions that have plagued Afghanistan for decades. Most of 
Afghanistan’s population is composed of member of the Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, 
and Hazara ethnic groups. Claims of certain ethnic groups receiving preferential 
treatment are common (and certainly not unique to the GIRoA or ANSF). Despite 
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President Hamid Karzai and several other high-ranking members of the GIRoA 
being Pashtun, Tajiks have been, and continue to be, overrepresented in the 
ANA, and especially in the officer corps, as a result of absorption of a large 
number of Northern Alliance members into the ANA’s ranks at its inception. 
Conversely, the Pashtuns, despite being Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group 
(comprising 42% of the population),128 continue to be highly underrepresented in 
the ANA.129 Ethnic misrepresentation is even more pronounced in the ANA 
Special Forces (ANASF, discussed in more detail below), where a 
disproportionately large percentage ANASF candidates are Hazaras, while a 
disproportionately small percentage are Pashtuns.130 
Another reason Pashtuns may be being discriminated against is that most 
members of the Taliban are also Pashtun,131 which has caused members of 
some other ethnic groups to mistrust Pashtuns in general. Furthermore, 
President Karzai’s recent negotiations with the Taliban have increased the divide 
between Pashtuns and other ethnic groups.132 In an effort to mitigate ethnic 
misrepresentation in the ANA, Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak 
has established percentage targets for each ANA brigade in order to maintain 
ethnic balance,133 but maintaining proportionate ethnic representation is just the 
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more on ethnicity, or on other factors including personal loyalty, rather than on 
ability or merit. If this is allowed to continue, it may cause the creation of rival 
factions within the ANA,134 which will undermine the overall public trust they 
enjoy, and therefore their effectiveness.  
Similar to the challenge faced by U.S. advisors in establishing a 
professional NCO corps in El Salvador, ANA NCOs were not readily accepted 
early on. Under previous military incarnations in Afghanistan, senior officers 
made nearly all decisions, and delegated tasks to junior officers that would have 
been the responsibility of NCOs in the U.S. military. This paradigm carried over 
into the early development of the ANA, leaving NCOs with virtually no 
responsibilities and minimal oversight, which led to a lack of motivation. Afghan 
NCOs became not much more than additional soldiers, rather than capable 
professionals who could lead soldiers and contribute to the competence and 
effectiveness of their unit, and the ANA as a whole. Despite this initial reluctance, 
NCOs have begun to have a greater impact in the ANA, thanks in part to the 
appointment of a Sergeant Major of the Afghan Army (a position which never 
before existed, and which, although it may have been done simply “to please the 
Americans,” has resulted in significant progress toward a professional ANA NCO 
corps).135 
Another challenge facing the development of the ANSF relates to 
determining the role of women in contributing to the security of Afghanistan. 
Despite the relative loosening of gender restrictions since the fall of the Taliban, 
Afghan culture continues to be male-dominated. However, females are being 
given opportunities—including some in the ANSF—that would have been 
unheard of until recently. On September 23, 2010, the ANA commissioned its 
first group of female officers, as 29 females graduated from a 20-week program 
of instruction that included eight weeks of basic training and twelve weeks of 
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branch-specific training. This training—which was conducted separately from 
male officer candidates—was conducted by an all-female cadre formed from a 
U.S. Army Reserve unit. Although female officers will be limited to performing 
duties relating to finance and logistics (and will likely continue to be 
underrepresented in the ANA), this represents a significant step toward gender 
equality in the ANSF.136 
In addition to the significant challenges inherent to developing the ANSF, 
the U.S. advisory effort in Afghanistan is also hampered by some self-imposed 
challenges. Among the most significant of these is that the selection process for 
U.S. personnel being assigned to advisory positions in Afghanistan does not 
assess their suitability to perform advisory duties.137 Furthermore, once selected, 
these personnel receive little or no advisory training prior to assuming these 
duties.138 Even if personnel selected for advisory duties are themselves adept at 
the tasks and functions with which they are charged to train others, they may not 
possess the proper attributes to be effective advisors. Furthermore, even those 
who do possess such attributes will likely require specific training prior to 
advising partner nation forces.  
F. ESTABLISHING AN AFGHAN SPECIAL FORCES CAPABILITY 
United States Army Special Forces Groups have traditionally been 
regionally oriented, each with a specific area of responsibility designed to support 
a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC). This relationship is not, however, 
an exclusive one.139 The operational requirements of the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT)—and especially operations in Afghanistan—have necessitated that the 
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employment of Special Forces beyond their traditional geographic areas of 
responsibility. Since 2003, the 3rd and 7th Special Forces Groups, have served 
on an alternating basis as the core of the Combined Joint Special Operations 
Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A). Along with special operations forces from 
several allied nations, these units have conducted unconventional warfare (UW) 
missions, including traditional tasks, such as special reconnaissance (SR) and 
direct action (DA) missions against the Taliban. However, as the U.S. has 
attempted to transfer greater responsibility for fighting the war to the ANA and 
other local security forces, the two SF groups have supported that objective by 
conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID).  
When conducting FID, U.S. Special Forces units typically train the 
conventional (often called “regular”) forces of partner nations, but under certain 
circumstances they are called upon to establish a capability which matches their 
own in a partner nation’s military. As of early 2010, such is the case with 
Afghanistan. Although U.S. Special Forces have, since May 2007,140 primarily 
been responsible for training the ANA’s 7,000 man elite Commando Brigade, 
they were recently tasked with the initial establishment of a special forces 
capability in the ANA (ANASF). Although the Afghan government granted final 
approval for the establishment of a special forces capability in its military, the 
idea actually originated in the mind of Brigadier General Ed Reeder, former 
commander of the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-
Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) and a previous CJSOTF-A commander, and was 
endorsed by General Stanley A. McChrystal, then the ISAF commander.141 
Regardless of the inspiration for developing this capability, it is clearly necessary 
if the ANA is to be a fully capable force. Throughout 2010, special operations 
missions—generally conducted by U.S. and NATO SOF—have become 
increasingly prevalent through Afghanistan, and have caused some dissension 
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between the GIRoA and the U.S. government. The U.S. has therefore pledged to 
allow ANASF a greater role in such operations in the future, with the intent to 
eventually shift the weight of SOF missions to Afghan control as their capabilities 
increase.142 
In instances when a partner nation desires its own special forces 
capability, U.S. Special Forces are obviously the best choice to lead the 
establishment and development of that capability. In addition to the arguably 
enhanced cultural knowledge and sensitivity that SF soldiers possess, the nature 
of their training and operational experience gives them the appropriate skills to 
pass on to prospective SF soldiers in a partner nation. Furthermore, the structure 
of ANASF teams is based directly on that of a 12-man U.S. SF Operational 
Detachment-Alpha (SFODA), with three additional positions (an extra intelligence 
sergeant, an information dissemination sergeant, and a civil-military operations 
specialist). The training ANASF candidates must complete is also designed to be 
very similar to the training U.S. SF students attend, with the exception of 
language training and a distinct phase for survival training. Candidates must 
complete a one-week assessment and selection phase in order to be accepted 
into the 17-week training course, which, like its American model, emphasizes 
adaptive thinking skills. However, the ANASF teams will not be considered fully 
qualified until they complete a 26-week “on-the-job training” period, during which 
they will be partnered with a U.S. SFODA, which will certify that the ANASF 
teams are fully qualified to operate independently.143 
There are several challenges inherent to establishing an Afghan SF 
capability. One such challenge is that, in order to quickly qualify the initial class of 
ANASF soldiers, candidates had to be pulled from the ranks of the Commando 
Brigade, to take advantage of the fact that they were already trained in direct 
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action, and would therefore require training only in internal defense and special 
reconnaissance. Although these were clearly the best candidates for Special 
Forces training, their departure from the Commando Brigade has created 
vacancies in that unit that need to be filled. Furthermore, since ANASF was 
deemed a higher priority than the Commando Brigade, the development of the 
latter has been halted to accommodate the full development of the ANASF. The 
ultimate goal is to field 72 ANASF teams, grouped into four kandaks (battalions), 
under a group headquarters,144 meaning that over 1,000 Afghan soldiers will be 
drawn from conventional ANA units and the Commander Brigade to fill these 
slots.  
G.  ADDITIONAL USES OF U.S. SPECIAL FORCES 
In addition to training conventional and elite units of the ANA, U.S. Special 
Forces units are also currently being used to train Afghan National Civil Order 
Police (ANCOP) units. The purpose of these units—as their name implies—is to 
maintain order within their areas of responsibility. However, they will most likely 
accomplish this by maintaining a visible presence, and performing tasks, 
including manning checkpoints, etc., that will require them to interact with the 
Afghan population. They will most likely not be required to conduct raids like a 
paramilitary force, or to conduct criminal investigations like a traditional U.S. 
police force. Most of their probable tasks are quite similar to those with which 
most conventional units have become quite comfortable as a result of over nine 
years of operations in Afghanistan. The use of SFODAs to train ANCOP units is 
arguably unnecessary, because conventional units are competent in such tasks, 
and more abundant than SOF.145 Special Forces teams have also begun training 
local militias, which, upon completion of their training, will be controlled by local 
police chiefs in 23 areas considered to be beyond the reach (if not the capability) 
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of regular ANSF to influence.146 These units hearken back to the People’s Self-
Defense Force (PSDF) in Vietnam,147 both in their stated purpose and in the 
additional effect they may have of empowering local populations not only for the 
purpose of assuming responsibility for their own security, but also to mitigate the 
temptation to join the Taliban. 
Although there is obviously support for local initiatives like those described 
above, there is also a fair amount of criticism of such programs. Local security 
initiatives like the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) and the Community 
Defense Initiative (CDI)148 caused concerns that, instead of empowering local 
communities to maintain their own security while reducing the strain on security 
forces, they would instead be enabling corruption by taking advantage of a lack 
in security force reach. Although the CDI was ultimately short-lived in its initial 
manifestation,149 it was merely absorbed into the Village Stabilization Program 
(VSP), which is an overarching name for several different local security 
programs.150 Those who criticize this type of program (including detractors in the 
U.S. Embassy in Kabul, and even some members of the GIRoA) often do so not 
because of doubts as to their efficacy; in fact, they argue that the opposite 
condition may in fact be cause for greater concern. Enabling security forces at 
the local level—and justifying doing so specifically because national security 
forces are unable to establish a presence in those areas—may result in a return 
to conditions similar to those that existed when “warlords” controlled many parts 
of Afghanistan that were beyond the reach of a central authority. These local 
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defense groups are currently being trained and mentored by U.S. Special Forces 
(with the implied task of ensuring that they do not evolve into militias);151 
however, once these forces are no longer present, the local security forces will 
ostensibly be independent. Although ANA SF teams are intended to assume the 
“oversight” role as soon as it reaches operational capability,152 there were still 
concerns that such “bottom-up” approaches would result in power being held at 
the local level at the expense of the influence of the GIRoA. As a result of these 
concerns (with which President Karzai and some U.S. embassy staffers agreed), 
the VSP was quickly transitioned into the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program,153 
but it remains to be seen if this change was merely in name only. Seth G. Jones 
asserts that, “Keeping [local] forces small, defensive, under the direct control of 
local jirgas and shuras, and monitored by Afghan national and coalition forces 
should prevent the rise of warlords in Afghanistan.”154 However, the complexity 
of this mere statement, the number of conditions and elements it prescribes—
and the integration between them it would necessitate—illustrate how difficult a 
task it will be. 
H. THE WAY AHEAD 
On December 1, 2009, President Barack Obama announced his intent to 
begin large-scale withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan beginning in July 
2011,155 and this guidance was reiterated in the DoD’s 2010 QDR Report.156 
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Although it remains to be seen what the scope and pace of this withdrawal will be 
(or when it will actually begin), it is likely that U.S. troops will not fully depart from 
Afghanistan, but will instead undergo a change of mission not unlike that which 
recently took place in Iraq. When conditions warrant it, U.S. troops—which are 
already providing Security Force Assistance to the ANSF—will shift their focus so 
that SFA is their main effort. It remains to be seen, however, if Afghan President 
Hamid Karzai’s determination “that Afghan National Security Forces will be 
responsible for all military and law enforcement operations throughout our 
country by 2014.”157 Although a 2014 departure is a goal—rather than a 
deadline—contingent upon the development of the ANSF,158 it remains to be 
seen how long countries providing forces to develop the ANSF will possess the 
resolve to continue that mission, especially if they are faced with more shifting 
objectives, whether they are based on time, or on the size or competence of the 
ANSF. 
Lieutenant General William Caldwell, currently the commander of NTM-
A/CSTC-A, previously hoped that the ANSF would be fully capable by the end of 
October 2011, but in light of the problems discussed above; this may no longer 
be a realistic goal. Caldwell recently reported that, at least in terms of numerical 
growth, both the ANA and ANP are actually ahead of schedule. According to 
Caldwell, “The growth has been so dramatic that both the ANA and ANP have 
exceeded their 2010 growth goals by about three months ahead of schedule.”159 
However, in late 2010 Caldwell, adjusting his previous position, stated that 
without an additional 900 trainers (an increase of nearly 50% over current 
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numbers), the ANSF will not be prepared in time to meet the 2014 objective.160 In 
late 2009, General Stanley McChrystal, then the ISAF commander, requested 
that NATO partners contribute an additional 2,000 trainers to assist the ANSF, 
but his request was met with little enthusiasm.161  
In any assistance effort, specific capabilities may require more resources 
to develop than others. One of the best examples of such a capability is aviation 
support. Just as in El Salvador, additional forces have had to be sent to train 
pilots in the ANA Air Corps (ANAAC) how to fly fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, 
which is being conducted by the CSTC-A’s Combined Air Power Transition 
Force.162 Furthermore, some Afghan pilots have been trained in the U.S., 
repeating a method used during U.S. assistance to El Salvador in the 1980s.163 
The ANAAC continues to make significant improvements, having increased its 
support to the ANA from 10% of missions in early 2008 to 90% in 2009. 
However, even if their training is maintained at its current pace, the ANAAC will 
not reach full operational capability until 2016.164 
While we cannot leave Afghanistan before the ANSF is a capable force, 
neither can we remain in Afghanistan too long, even if for the purpose of 
ensuring that the ANSF are adequately prepared to assume responsibility for 
security in Afghanistan. The longer we remain in Afghanistan, the greater the risk 
of further alienating a population that is already critical of foreign forces165—
which many of them view as occupiers—to such a degree that they are beginning 
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to shift their support to the Taliban in many provinces. For this reason, in addition 
to the necessity to make U.S. forces available for other contingencies, time is of 
the essence, and we must focus on increasing the ability of the ANSF to conduct 
independent operations, so U.S. forces can leave Afghanistan. 
I. SUMMARY 
Current security force assistance operations in Afghanistan exhibit several 
challenges, some of which are inherent to the specific operating environment, 
and some of which have been self-imposed by NATO, the U.S., or the GIRoA, or 
a combination of them. Although the operating environment in Afghanistan is 
very complex, it does not account for the lack of development of the ANSF after 
over eight years of U.S. and NATO presence, despite the fact that the focus of 
that presence was on combat operations, rather than on security force 
assistance, for the first several years. 
Although what Westerners may consider corruption is commonplace in 
Afghanistan, it has reached such a level—particularly with respect to the 
appointment and election of government officials—that the Afghan population is 
beginning to favor allowing the Taliban to return to power, at least at local levels. 
The perceived corruption of the GIRoA presents it with one of its greatest 
challenges, because a government that does not have the trust of its population 
cannot function effectively, nor can its security forces. Additionally, the lack of 
accountability within the ANSF has reached a level that can no longer be 
accepted, because it is clearly having a detrimental effect on their development. 
Although the U.S. and NATO are in Afghanistan with the permission of the 
GIRoA, similar to the conditions the U.S. placed on its continued assistance to El 
Salvador during the 1980s, the GIRoA—and by extension the ANSF—must be 
held accountable for its actions to continue receiving financial, material, and 
operational assistance. 
Perhaps the greatest self-imposed challenge (for which NATO/the U.S. 
and the GIRoA must share responsibility), is the lack of a clear vision for the 
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ANSF, in terms of size, organization and competency. The most glaring 
manifestation of this apparent confusion is the myriad incarnations of different 
ANSF organizations, some of which, because of their local focus, have the 
potential to undermine the influence of any centralized government. Although the 
focus of the NTM-A/CSTC-A should be to build the ANA and ANP, the inability of 
the GIRoA to extend its influence into rural areas of Afghanistan has 
necessitated the establishment of several different local security and defense 
initiatives (including some, which, in the interest of brevity, were not even 
mentioned in this work). Furthermore, the rapidity with which these programs 
have superseded one another (for example, the evolution of the AP3 to the CDI , 
which rapidly became the LDI, then VSP, then ALP, all within the span of less 
than 18 months), betrays the lack of clear direction between NATO, the U.S., and 
the GIRoA. Even when considering only the ANA and ANP, there is a clear lack 
of long-term vision with respect to their development. The constantly increasing 
numerical objectives for the ANSF, which have been increased several times 
before previous increases had even been achieved, are evidence of this.  
As the incarnations of nominal ANSF organizations have grown and 
evolved, so too have the command and control structures charged with 
overseeing their operations and development. Within the ISAF structure, the 
NTM-A/CSTC-A is responsible not only for providing advisors to military units, 
but to the ministerial level as well. The ISAF Joint Command (IJC) is responsible 
for coordinating combined operations involving ANSF and ISAF forces working 
together throughout all phases of major operations. However, due to the ever-
increasing requirements of these missions, neither entity has been able to 
consistently field personnel with adequate training to serve as advisors. In fact, 
the NTM-A/CSTC-A has never been fully manned (despite requesting additional 
manpower from NATO partners), even with untrained personnel. With respect to 
the ISAF forces conducting partnered operations with the ANSF, very few of 
these forces (with the exception of U.S. Special Forces) receive advisory training  
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before being embedded with their ANSF partner units. Finally, Coalition partners 
in Afghanistan must begin making greater contributions to the security force 
assistance mission there if it is to be effective.  
There are also several problems inherent to the ANSF that cannot be 
easily overcome by U.S. or NATO efforts, but must be addressed by the GIRoA. 
The ANSF will never gain the trust of the Afghan public unless ethnic balance is 
achieved within its ranks. Even if such a balance is ever achieved, ethnic 
concentrations in localized areas may still be reluctant to recognize centralized 
authority, choosing instead to rely on local militias to provide security, which will 
set the conditions for a return to “warlordism.” Until the GIRoA can overcome the 
perception that it is corrupt, can gain the public trust, and can extend its influence 
into rural areas of Afghanistan, these conditions will persist. Finally, until the 
GIRoA is able to overcome its unusually high desertion rates, it will not be able to 
maintain security forces capable of defending Afghanistan without assistance. 
Ongoing operations in Afghanistan are undoubtedly the most publicized 
U.S. military operations in the world. However, although Afghanistan is the most 
resource intensive theater of operations supporting Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF), there are other countries to which the U.S. is providing assistance under 
the auspices of OEF as well. Although it is on the other side of the world, and 
presents the U.S. government and military with different objectives and 
challenges, one such country is the Philippines, where U.S. forces are involved in 
Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P). 
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IV. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE PHILIPPINES 
Although it is one of the smaller U.S. military operations currently ongoing, 
U.S. assistance to the Philippines has yielded significantly positive results for the 
last several years. Harkening back to U.S. assistance to El Salvador, art of the 
reason for this success is the employment of Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
as the main effort in the operation, which has also allowed for another factor 
contributing to success, which is the ability of the U.S. to maintain a minimal 
military presence in the Philippines, therefore ensuring that indigenous security 
forces are held responsible for the security of the Philippines. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The continuing presence of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the 
Philippines is one example of U.S. assistance that is being conducted almost 
exclusively by SOF, with little involvement from General Purpose Forces (GPF). 
Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) began with the deployment of 
Special Forces soldiers to the southern Philippines in early 2002, to assist the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in combating Islamic militant groups that 
were gaining strength, particularly in the southern Philippines.166 Although there 
have been several insurgent groups operating in the Philippines over the last 
several years, the main targets of the operation are the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 
and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Prior to a negotiated ceasefire that took effect in 
2003, the U.S. assisted the GRP in its struggle against the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF).167 In return, the U.S. received assistance in its own 
pursuit of the ASG and JI. Ironically, the cessation of hostilities between the GRP 
and the MILF created conditions that contributed to the growth of other Islamic 
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groups, including the ASG and JI, especially in the southern Philippines.168 In 
addition to undermining the stability of the Philippines, both the ASG and JI have 
aligned themselves with al-Qa’eda and committed acts of terror, including the 
Bali bombings in 2002 (for which JI claimed responsibility), which killed more 
than 200 people.169 U.S. involvement in the Philippines was, therefore, 
considered part of OEF, because defeating these groups supports U.S. national 
objectives in what was formerly known as the Global War on Terror (GWOT).170  
B. ADVISORY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES 
Since its inception, OEF-P has been almost exclusively a Special Forces-
based operation, using the 1st Special Forces Group as the foundation of the 
Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). These forces had 
the benefit of a long-standing relationship with the AFP, based on JCETs and 
large-scale routine joint training exercises. U.S. participation in these exercises—
and the conduct of OEF-P—has been allowed by the Visiting Forces Agreement 
(VFA), which was ratified by the Philippine Senate in 1999.171 This prior 
relationship made the transition to more robust assistance relatively easy. 
However, OEF-P continues to be subject to several caveats, imposed not only by 
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), but also by the U.S. 
Pacific Command (PACOM). The most important restriction placed on U.S. 
assistance to the AFP is the provision in the Philippine constitution that prohibits 
foreign military forces from engaging in direct combat in the Philippines. This 
restriction has set the tone for the conduct of OEF-P since it was initiated and, 
similar to previous U.S. assistance to El Salvador has preserved the primacy of 
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Philippine military forces and civilian institutions.172 With the AFP conducting 
combat operations, U.S. forces have been free to conduct humanitarian 
assistance missions like building new roads, schools, and irrigation systems. 
However, U.S. forces always ensure that the Philippine government receives the 
credit for such projects, which not only contributes to their own acceptance by the 
population, but to increasing the perceived legitimacy of the Philippine 
government and the AFP.173 In addition to U.S. forces fulfilling a limited role in 
the Philippines, the size of the U.S. contingent in the Philippines is severely 
limited as well. Currently, fewer than 600 U.S. troops—mostly Special Operations 
Forces—are providing training and intelligence support to the AFP,174 down from 
a high of nearly 2,000 in 2003.175 The GRP does not desire a large U.S. 
presence in the Philippines, both to protect its perceived legitimacy in the eyes of 
the population and to avoid escalation of the conflict. Perhaps most importantly, 
however, is that the nature of the mission, which, as a result of the insurgency 
and restrictive terrain, is more suited to small unit operations than to large-scale 
troop movements. 
Although operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have been characterized by 
large troop presences, ongoing operations in the Philippines are an example of 
how employing smaller numbers of U.S. forces to train and advise partner nation 
forces can produce positive results. As stated in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR) Report: 
Efforts that use smaller numbers of U.S. forces and emphasize host-
nation leadership are generally preferable to large-scale counterinsurgency 
campaigns.  
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By emphasizing host-nation leadership and employing modest numbers of 
U.S. forces, the United States can sometimes obviate the need for larger-scale 
counterinsurgency campaigns. For example, since 2002 U.S. forces have trained 
and advised elements of the Philippine armed forces working to secure areas of 
the southern Philippines that had been a haven for the Abu Sayyaf terrorist 
organization and other terrorist elements. Over the past eight years, U.S. forces 
and their Philippine counterparts have trained together and worked to understand 
the organization and modus operandi of the adversary. As their equipment and 
skills have improved, Philippine forces have patrolled more widely and more 
frequently, bringing security to previously contested areas.176 
The QDR Report cites other areas where this model is currently being 
used successfully, including the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and Colombia.177 
Operations, such as these, provide economy of force while maintaining partner 
nation primacy, which is often necessary based on the internal (and international) 
political climate, making them more desirable than larger-scale troop presences. 
However, one of the main differences between U.S. assistance to the Philippines 
and efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq is the initial status of the forces we were sent 
to assist. Although the AFP is chronically underfunded (the Philippines devotes 
only 1% of its Gross Domestic Product to defense and security),178 and is widely 
considered to be among the weakest militaries in Asia,179 the 130,000 member 
AFP180 has been improving steadily in terms of competence since the beginning 
of OEF-P. This improvement is most likely the result—at least in part—of  
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constantly operating in an active COIN environment, but U.S. assistance (a large 
part of which is provided by JSOTF-P) has surely had a positive impact on the 
AFP as well. 
Although U.S. Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alphas (SFODAs) 
typically operate independently when conducting most of their core tasks, the 
nature of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions generally makes it desirable to 
integrate other disciplines around a Special Forces core. This technique is being 
widely applied in the Philippines, with SFODAs split into two elements, each of 
which is then augmented with Civil Affairs, Military Information Support 
Operations (formerly Psychological Operations) soldiers, Joint Service enablers, 
and logistics personnel. The resultant organizations are known as Liaison Control 
Elements (LCEs), and are generally partnered with Philippine forces at the 
battalion, brigade, and division level. Although the focus of this study is on 
ground forces, the same method is employed with U.S. Navy SEAL platoons, 
which operate with Philippine Marine forces.181  
The cooperation between U.S. military forces and the AFP provides 
benefits to both the GRP and the U.S. government, contributing to the overall 
security of the Philippines and, by virtue of occupying groups allied with al-
Qa’eda, to the security of the United States as well. However, as Petit asserts, 
the mission of the U.S. Special Forces units currently operating in the Philippines 
is not to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, but to enhance the 
capabilities and capacity of the ARP while they conduct COIN operations.182 As 
such, U.S. units in the Philippines are conducting FID in support of the GRP. This 
is not to say that they are not conducting Security Force Assistance (SFA) 
because, as discussed in the introduction to this work, the doctrinal distinctions 
between FID and SFA do more to confuse than clarify, and FID is best described 
as a type of SFA specifically meant to address internal threats, including 
insurgencies. Furthermore, although U.S. assistance to the Philippines is being 
                                            
181 Petit, “OEF-Philippines: Thinking COIN, Practicing FID,” 14. 
182 Ibid., 12. 
 64
conducted by SOF personnel, the designation of the mission as a FID effort is 
due not to the type of troops involved, but in the threat against which they partner 
nation forces to which they are providing assistance are focused. 
C. ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE MEASURES IN THE PHILIPPINES 
In addition to providing “boots on the ground” support, U.S. SFA 
operations typically include a technological and/or financial element. In the case 
of the Philippines, both of these mechanisms are used to provide additional aid to 
the typically underfunded AFP. The U.S. provided $38 million in financial 
assistance to the Philippines in 2001, but that amount has increased steadily 
since the beginning of OEF-P, up to $94 million in 2009. In 2010, the U.S. is 
scheduled to provide $118.5 million in aid to the Philippines.183 In addition to 
providing economic aid, the U.S. recently pledged to provide the Philippine 
government with $18.4 worth of precision-guided missiles in 2010.184 Military and 
technological contributions are not the only means by which the U.S. can assist 
partner nations, however. As discussed earlier, Security Force Assistance cannot 
be successful if it relies solely on military efforts. Since OEF-P began in 2002, the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has contributed more than 
$500 million to development projects in Mindanao. These programs have sought 
to improve education, health care, infrastructure, governance, law enforcement, 
and other areas.185 Without enabling efforts, such as these, resulting in improved 
stability, and therefore greater population support, SFA efforts—especially those 
conducted during periods of conflict, and particularly those in competition with 
insurgencies—cannot be successful.  
As discussed earlier, the success of any FID or SFA effort requires the 
support of the population, which is contingent on their perception of the 
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indigenous government as legitimate. Even if the population of a given country 
perceives its government as legitimate prior to it requesting or allowing a foreign 
military to operate within its borders, the presence of that foreign military—
however brief—may erode that perceived legitimacy. Furthermore, the longer a 
foreign military assists a partner nation—regardless of the reason for their 
presence, or the results they produce—the greater the chance that the 
population will begin to see them as an unwelcome intrusion, if not an occupying 
force. The small “footprint” maintained by U.S. forces currently operating in the 
Philippines is a deliberate attempt to forestall this from happening, but it cannot 
remain effective indefinitely. Although the Philippine government continues to 
allow the presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines, the relationship has not been 
without problems, or detractors. Citing incidents involving U.S. forces, including 
at least one rape and the death of a Filipino interpreter working for the U.S., 
some groups have called for the GRP to void the VFA and remove all U.S. forces 
from the Philippines.186 As a result, members of the Philippine Congress recently 
filed a joint resolution calling for the abolition of the VFA, and newly elected 
President Benigno Aquino has been calling for a review and refinement of the 
agreement for some time.187 Although the AFP have improved markedly as a 
result of years of U.S. assistance, as well as operational experience, the removal 
of U.S. forces from the Philippines would likely cause a decline in the AFP’s 
effectiveness, as well as denying the U.S. direct access to an important front in 
the fight against Islamic militants. 
D. SUMMARY 
U.S. assistance to the Philippines, although relying on a small number of 
mostly Special Operations Forces soldiers, is almost certainly the most 
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successful ongoing SFA effort. Similar to U.S. assistance to El Salvador during 
the 1980s and 1990s, this effort is centered on developing the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines into an effective military force, but one with a primarily internal 
focus, due to persistent insurgency. Furthermore, providing assistance to the 
Philippines, like El Salvador, supports not only the partner nation’s goals, but 
U.S. goals (specifically, countering Islamic extremist groups, in support of the 
GWOT). Perhaps most importantly, U.S. assistance to the Philippines is subject 
to strict limits established not only by the partner nation, but by the U.S. as well. 
However, unlike assistance to El Salvador (but similar to current assistance to 
Afghanistan and Iraq) continued U.S. assistance to the Philippines is contingent 
more upon the continued permission of the GRP than on the U.S.’s approval of 
the GRP’s actions. 
From its inception, OEF-P has had the benefit of a previously established 
relationship between the 1st Special Forces Group and the AFP (comparable to 
the relationship the 7th SF Group enjoyed with the ESAF), as well as the mission 
to develop an already existing military, unlike SFA efforts currently underway in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, where U.S. (and NATO) forces are building partner nation 
militaries from the ground up. Furthermore, the forces involved in OEF-P have 
not had the mission of developing Filipino security forces in general, instead 
having the benefit of focusing solely on the military. For this reason, as well as 
their demonstrated ability to yield results in restrictive operating environments 
that require limited U.S. force presence, Special Forces have proven to be the 
right choice to assist the AFP in conducting COIN operations. As Robert D. 
Kaplan, based on his observation of Special Forces operations in the Philippines, 
asserts, “The most crucial tactical lesson of the Philippines war is that the smaller 
the unit, and the farther forward it is deployed among the indigenous population, 
the more it can accomplish.”188 Another characteristic of Special Forces that has 
contributed to their success in assisting the AFP is their language capability. 
Although English is one of the Philippines’ official languages (the other being 
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Filipino),189 since the 1st Special Forces Group comprises the core of JSOTF-P, 
they have been able to take advantage of their language skills to a far greater 
degree than their counterparts in Afghanistan, the 3rd and 7th SF Groups. 
However, in order to allow 1st SF Group subordinate units to maintain 
competency at other SF core missions, they have been deployed to Iraq as well.  
The assistance provided by the U.S. to the Philippines for the last several 
years, although it continues to receive less media coverage than ongoing 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, has in some respects been more successful 
than those larger operations. The lack of media coverage is most likely the result 
of the minimal presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines (and the 
commensurately low casualties U.S. forces have suffered there), despite the 
tactical and operational successes, U.S. and Filipino forces have had there. 
However, despite the differences between OEF-P and operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, it does share some common characteristics with these operations, 
especially with respect to the political environment in which each operation is 
being conducted. U.S. presence in Afghanistan recently exceeded nine years, 
and is nearing eight years in Iraq, and the longer U.S. forces remain in each 
country, the more strained U.S. relations seem to become. At the request of the 
Iraqi government, the U.S. has agreed to remove all military forces from Iraq by 
December 31, 2011.190 While there is no obvious animosity between the two 
governments, the mere establishment of a “deadline” for the U.S. to withdraw its 
forces, rather than basing such a move on the performance of Iraqi Security 
Forces is suspect. Afghanistan, however, has become even more complicated, 
especially in recent months.  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although the majority of the U.S.’s military effort has been focused on the 
CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) for nearly the last decade, we must 
also be prepared to assist partner nations in other regions to develop their own 
security capabilities, so they are capable of securing their respective countries 
against both internal and external threats. It is not reasonable or prudent to 
assume that once our current commitments in the CENTCOM AOR have 
concluded (or at least been significantly reduced), we will no longer be required 
to assist partner nations to develop their security capabilities. Recent U.S. SFA 
efforts have been based on ad hoc organizations, composed of individuals with 
little advisory training or experience who are typically taken out of their career 
field to perform advisory duties, which has likely limited their effectiveness. In 
order to be truly successful, SFA operations need to be based on enduring 
organizations and processes that focus not on post-conflict reconstruction, but on 
preempting the need for such reconstruction.191 
After over nine years in Afghanistan, it is clear that we must adjust our 
approach to SFA operations in the future. The ad hoc approach we have 
consistently employed in Afghanistan has undoubtedly undermined the success 
of the SFA mission there, most likely prolonging U.S. involvement there. In order 
to avoid repeating the same mistakes we have made in Afghanistan in the future, 
we must therefore apply new standards to future SFA operations.   
A. CLEARLY DEFINED GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
Although the most obvious goal of any SFA operation is the development 
of a partner nation’s security capability, such efforts must also contribute to the 
achievement of U.S. goals and objectives. Ideally, a partner nation should 
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establish its own goals for the development of its security forces. Without the 
establishment of clear goals and objectives—agreed upon by both the U.S. and 
partner nation governments—we run the risk of not only becoming subject to 
“mission creep,” but also to the subordination of U.S. interests and objectives to 
partner nation objectives. Ideally, the objectives for SFA will support the partner 
nation’s IDAD program. However, in Afghanistan, the government did not have 
such a program, and U.S. forces there found themselves not only taking the lead 
to develop these objectives, but virtually doing so on their own. Although the U.S. 
is unlikely to share all of its objectives with a partner nation, they must be well 
founded in U.S. national interests. The assistance the U.S. provided to El 
Salvador was undertaken not because of a particularly close alliance between 
the U.S. and El Salvador, but because the U.S. had a vested interest in 
preventing the spread of communism into the Western Hemisphere. The 
continued presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, however, seems to have 
become focused more on satisfying the GIRoA’s goals than on protecting U.S. 
interests.  
Although the military goal of U.S. assistance to El Salvador was based in 
part on numerical growth, a far more important aspect of that goal was improving 
the competency of the El Salvadoran Armed Forces to such a level that it would 
be able to defeat a strong insurgency, which it ultimately was. Furthermore, in El 
Salvador, the U.S. had the benefit of advising an already established military, 
rather than establishing a military from “the ground up,” as we have had to do in 
Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, however, there appears to be an increasing level of 
emphasis on numerical growth of the ANSF, as well as the establishment of 
ancillary security organizations, in response to the central government’s inability 
to govern rural areas. 
In Afghanistan, we did not establish clearly defined goals and objectives 
for the development of the Afghan National Security Forces until several years 
after initiating this assistance, and as a result, we have been faced with 
constantly increasing thresholds for the growth of the ANA (and commensurate 
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increases in U.S. troop levels). According to Robert D. Kaplan, “The U.S. 
approach to El Salvador showed that as much help as the U.S. gives a besieged 
ally in a small war, ultimately, military and humanitarian assistance must operate 
under a reasonably strict ceiling, so that the war remains the ally’s to win or 
lose.”192 However, this conclusion assumes a minimum level of partner nation 
competence, which, although present in El Salvador, was clearly lacking in 
Afghanistan at the outset of U.S. assistance there. Even the highest goals thus 
far established may not be sufficient to secure Afghanistan, and as a result of not 
conducting a clear assessment of Afghanistan’s security needs, and then 
focusing more on numerical growth than on competency, the U.S. has found 
itself in what seems to have become an open-ended commitment. 
Just as important as the goals and objectives for U.S. Security Force 
Assistance being agreed upon by the U.S. and a partner nation and clearly 
stated, they must be realistic, achievable goals that are critical to the partner 
nation’s ability to achieve its own security. One example of an objective upon 
which the U.S. tends to place too much emphasis is the establishment of 
professional NCO corps in partner nation security forces we are assisting. In both 
El Salvador and Afghanistan, a significant level of effort was/is being leveraged 
against establishing professional NCO corps in the security forces. Although 
NCOs play a critical role in the U.S. military, cultural and societal differences in 
partner nations may not be conducive to develop such a model. In the case of El 
Salvador, the U.S. military was tasked with developing an existing military, but 
one that did not have a professional NCO corps. Despite this, however, U.S. 
advisors—based on their experience—attempted to affect a radical change in the 
ESAF’s internal culture by imposing such a capability. Their efforts, however, 
were met with resistance, if not derision, and were ultimately less than 
successful. In the case of Afghanistan, where there were essentially no security 
forces, the U.S. and its NATO partners were forced to fully establish these 
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forces. It would seem that the establishment of a professional NCO corps would 
be more easily accomplished under such circumstances, but this effort was 
initially resisted, and has only recently begun yielding results. This is just one 
example of a developmental objective that, although valuable from the 
perspective of the U.S., may not be critical to—and in fact may detract from the 
effort to assist—a partner nation.  
Critical to the determination of the goals and objectives of SFA is the 
conduct of an assessment of conditions and requirements in a partner nation 
before initiating SFA operations. In Afghanistan, where there were no existing 
security forces to use as a starting point, this assessment seems to have been 
delayed several years, which has certainly hampered the development of the 
ANSF. Conversely, in El Salvador, both the ESAF and their U.S. advisors clearly 
benefitted from the “Woerner Report,” which established a baseline upon which 
to base the goals of U.S. assistance. Although it will not always be possible to 
conduct, such assessments prior to initiating all future SFA efforts, an effort must 
be made to do so in as many cases as possible. 
B. UNITY AND CONTINUITY OF EFFORT 
Once clearly defined objectives for a Security Force Assistance operation 
are established, it is critical that all parties involved work toward common goals 
(unity of effort), and that these goals are pursued with a consistent approach 
(continuity of effort), rather than one that explores too many options, or moves on 
to new options too quickly. This is another one of the shortcomings of our 
ongoing assistance effort in Afghanistan, that we must correct in future 
assistance operations.  
United States assistance to El Salvador was characterized by unity of 
effort—both within the U.S. government and between the U.S. and the partner 
nation—unique among historical (and current) U.S. advisory efforts. Although the 
U.S. (at the government, ministerial, and advisor levels) at times had to goad the 
GOES and ESAF into agreeing to certain measures related to the assistance 
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being provided, as well as to the prosecution of the civil war against the FMLN, 
the U.S. advisory effort in El Salvador was generally characterized by unity of 
effort. In Afghanistan, however, there is increasing evidence that unity of effort 
between Afghanistan and the U.S. and its NATO partners is beginning to erode. 
In addition to Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s initially secret negotiations with 
the Taliban, he recently requested that the U.S. reduce its special operations 
missions in Afghanistan, but the U.S. leadership seems unwilling to oblige 
him.193 Furthermore, Karzai himself recently described the relationship between 
the U.S. and Afghan governments as “grudging.”194 Based on these and other 
recent developments, is clear that Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan is 
beginning to suffer from a lack of unity of effort, which may have been avoided if 
the U.S. government and the GIRoA had developed a more unified vision for the 
conduct of simultaneous and counterinsurgency and SFA operations years ago. 
Continuity of effort in SFA operations is very dependent on the 
establishment of clearly defined goals and objectives. By knowing the desired 
endstate of an SFA effort, U.S. forces can avoid initiating projects that do not 
contribute to, or even undermine, that effort. United States assistance to El 
Salvador exhibited continuity of effort, because, although the advisory methods 
used evolved to meet changing conditions in El Salvador, there were very few 
major adjustments to the effort. Conversely, advisory efforts in Afghanistan have 
been hampered by a tendency for the GIRoA and/or NATO to explore 
establishing new security organizations and methods before ongoing efforts have 
been fully developed. The result is a lack of continuity of effort, manifested in 
significant resources being dedicated to programs that barely get off the ground. 
This is at least partly the result of the changing priorities that have resulted in a 
fractious effort, manifested in the attempted development of several different 
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capabilities (CDI, LDI, AP3, ANCOP, etc.) in addition to the ANA and ANP. 
Although the U.S. cannot limit the number and scope of organizations that the 
GIRoA wishes to establish and employ to maintain security within its borders, the 
greater the number of distinct organizations that require training and assistance, 
the less focused and more resource intensive U.S. assistance becomes. 
Furthermore, not only do these additional entities detract from the focus of U.S. 
and NATO troops with respect to advisory priorities, they also dilute the already 
tenuous influence of the GIRoA in rural areas. In future SFA operations, in order 
to ensure both unity of effort between the U.S. government and a partner nation, 
as well as enduring continuity of effort, the U.S. must establish well-defined limits 
on the scope of the assistance it will provide, as well as the type of programs to 
which it will contribute forces.  
C. PLACING CONDITIONS ON U.S. ASSISTANCE  
United States SFA efforts in Afghanistan (as well as in Iraq) began after 
the conclusion of major combat operations (MCO) against the military forces of 
the regimes previously in power in those countries. However, this is not (and 
should not be considered in the future) the norm. At any given time, there are 
several other U.S. SFA operations in progress in partner nations around the 
world, which are undertaken only at the request of the partner nation. Although 
U.S. interests are served by conducting SFA missions, given that our partner 
nations request U.S. assistance to develop their security forces, we would be 
fully justified in making our continued assistance contingent upon the partner 
nation government adhering to certain standards of conduct.  
Future U.S. SFA efforts must be made contingent upon prescribed 
standards of conduct to which the partner nation government must adhere if it 
wishes to continue to receive assistance. These conditions must be agreed upon 
by both the U.S. and partner nation governments prior to the initiation of U.S. 
assistance, and must be closely monitored throughout the course of such 
assistance. What makes U.S. assistance to El Salvador differ from our current 
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SFA mission in Afghanistan is the fact that it was contingent upon clearly defined 
standards of conduct, to which the government of El Salvador had to adhere in 
order to continue receiving U.S. assistance. In Afghanistan, we have not 
established criteria that the GIRoA must meet, or behaviors that they must avoid, 
in order to continue receiving our assistance. As a result, regardless of the 
actions of the GIRoA, the U.S. government and NATO have no formal 
mechanisms through which to influence the GIRoA. Since no agreement on 
standards of conduct for the GIRoA (and its various components, including the 
ANSF) was not established prior to the initiation of assistance to the GIRoA, such 
a framework cannot be established now without damaging already strained U.S.-
Afghan relations. 
Based at least in part on the perceived ineffectiveness of the GIRoA 
(exacerbated by mistrust caused by widespread corruption), the Taliban has 
enjoyed a resurgence in popularity in recent months. As a result of this renewed 
popularity, the task of pacifying rural areas of Afghanistan has not only become 
more difficult for ANSF, but for U.S. and NATO forces as well. Although a certain 
level of corruption is not considered unusual in Afghanistan (as well as in other 
countries), had the U.S. and the GIRoA agreed to limits on such behavior—as 
well as prescribed consequences for it—we would now be in a better position to 
prevent the GIRoA from engaging in conduct that has the potential to undermine 
the success not only of assistance to Afghanistan, but the overall 
counterinsurgency effort there as well.  
D. ADVISOR SELECTION AND QUALIFICATION 
The individual advisor, having the most direct contact with partner nation 
personnel and units, is perhaps the most important factor in any U.S. assistance 
effort. Until recently, Special Forces (SF) units had all but exclusive claim to 
advisory duties, but the requirements of ongoing operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq made it necessary to employ GPF as advisors. However, merely assigning 
advisory duties to GPF personnel does not give them the skills necessary for 
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such duties. According to JCISFA’s Security Force Assistance Planner’s Guide, 
“Successful SFA operations require a detailed understanding of the operational 
environment, both the human elements like culture, tribal affiliations, politics, 
language and religion, and the more physical elements like geography, threat, 
infrastructure and economics.”195 Even a very skilled tactician will be an 
ineffective advisor if he is unable to build rapport with and relate to his 
counterpart. However, although GPF personnel (and, recently, units) have been 
tasked to conduct SFA missions, it is questionable whether they are receiving the 
training necessary to successfully accomplish these missions. In nearly every 
U.S. advisory effort, there has been no formal selection process to identify 
candidates with the skills necessary to be a successful advisor. With the 
exception of El Salvador, where previous experience in the region and Spanish 
language ability were viewed as advantages—but not requirements—for 
assignment as an advisor (although Special Forces qualification was desirable, it 
was not a prerequisite), availability for assignment seems to have been the main 
determinant of assignment as an advisor. This is certainly true with respect to the 
way GPF personnel are used to train security forces in as part of Military 
Transition Teams (MiTTs) or Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) (hereafter 
collectively referred to as TTs) in Afghanistan (as well as in Iraq). 
In addition to the apparent gap in advisory training and qualification, TTs 
are subject to several other factors that can reduce their effectiveness as 
advisors. As a result of the selection process to which they are subjected, and 
the extensive training they must complete, Special Forces personnel possess 
“unique skills in language qualification, regional orientation, cultural awareness, 
and interpersonal relations,” which are “keys to the successes experienced by SF 
units in the field.”196 Although GPF personnel who have been slated for a TT 
                                            
195 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, Security Force Assistance 
Planner’s Guide (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Joint Center for International Security Force 
Assistance, February 14, 2008), i. 
196 United States Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-05: Army Special Operations 
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assignment receive minimal training in the culture and language of the area in 
which they will be performing advisory duties, their training is not nearly as 
detailed or relevant to actual advisory missions as the training all SF personnel 
are required to complete. The training TT personnel must complete prior to 
deploying is weighted far more toward survivability and soldier skills than 
developing advisory skills.197 Evidence of this imbalance exists in JCISFA’s 
Transition Team Handbook, wherein less than 20 pages are devoted to advisory 
considerations (the balance—nearly 200 pages—is devoted to survival skills, 
battle drills, and equipment manuals).198 Furthermore, the training TT personnel 
receive is not meant to assess candidates’ suitability to serve as an advisor, or to 
disqualify those who do not possess the right attributes for such duties. Rather, 
this training is perfunctory in nature, and personnel who attend it have already 
been selected for a TT assignment, rather than being candidates for it, as SF 
volunteers are until they complete their training.  
Although TTs are usually (but not always) told before beginning their 
training what partner nation’s security forces they will be advising, they often 
receive no greater resolution about their destination until late in their training.199 
As a result, these TTs deploy without detailed knowledge about the area of 
operation (AO) they will be occupying, or the current status of the unit they will be 
advising.200 Although SF units often advise foreign security forces in countries 
outside their traditional areas of responsibility (AORs) (e.g., the rotation of 
battalions from the 35rd and 7th Special Forces Groups in Afghanistan since 
2002), SF units are able to maintain their focus on their traditional AORs by 
conducting JCETs when they are not deployed to the CENTCOM AOR. 
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Furthermore, although it is outside their traditional AORs, the long-term utilization 
of the 3rd and 7th SF Groups in Afghanistan has afforded them a degree of 
predictability and familiarity with where they will be operating. Personnel 
assigned to TTs have no such benefit, since they are not assigned official, or 
even habitual, AORs. 
Although SF units, like nearly all military units, are subject to personnel 
rotation, the low density of the SF career field allows many Special Forces 
Operational Detachment-Alphas (SFODAs) to serve multiple deployments with 
generally little personnel rotation. Conversely, TTs serve only one tour as a unit. 
Furthermore, most TT members only serve one tour performing advisory duties, 
and even those who serve additional TT tours do not typically do so in the same 
area, if even the same country. As a result, institutional knowledge and advisory 
experience are seldom retained at the tactical level, where it is arguably needed 
most.  
Although GPF personnel and units have enjoyed some success training 
the security forces of Afghanistan, some argue that conditions exist where 
mission success in FID or SFA cannot be achieved without SOF participation, if 
not exclusivity. According to John Mulbury, “in operations that require a force 
capable of working closely with a local population, working as an interagency 
player or working under an extremely sensitive political situation, ARSOF (Army 
Special Operations Forces) will remain the force of choice.”201 Mulbury cites 
current operations in the Philippines as an example of this type of environment, 
but Afghanistan fits his criteria just as well, if not more so. However, the massive 
scope of SFA operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has made GPF participation in 
the SFA efforts in those countries necessary. Unfortunately, the necessity to 
conduct or participate in such missions does not necessarily correlate to 
competence in the critical skill sets required for them.  
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Special Operations Forces espouse several “SOF Truths” that apply to 
their development and employment. Among these “truths” are “quality is better 
than quantity” and “Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced.” 
However, it is arguable that tasking GPF with missions traditionally performed by 
SOF units violates these principles. Although we are not mass-producing SOF, 
we may in fact be sacrificing quality for quantity by using an already abundant 
source of manpower to take the place of SOF for certain missions. Under 
circumstances that do not require the unique skill sets provided by SOF 
personnel or units, it would be inappropriate to employ them. However, it is 
perhaps even more inappropriate to employ GPF in circumstances that require 
capabilities that only SOF can provide. Special Operations Forces are “well 
suited to conduct or support FID because these forces have unique functional 
skills and language and cultural training,”202 and this is especially true of Army 
Special Forces. Although FID is only one of the core tasks of Special Forces, 
because of the extensive training these personnel receive, they are arguably the 
best choice for advisory missions. Special Forces personnel receive extensive 
training in foreign languages, as well as cultural education, that GPF personnel 
typically do not receive.  
Another important distinction between SOF and GPF, which can have an 
impact on the ability to train foreign forces, is SOF’s unique ability to operate in 
“hostile, denied, or political sensitive areas of the world”203 with “little or no 
external support”204 when necessary. Although this capability refers in part to 
SF’s ability to infiltrate, operate, and exfiltrate undetected, the more important 
aspect of this characteristic of SF operations (as it relates to training foreign 
forces) is their ability to conduct extended operations independent of both 
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significant logistical support and oversight from higher headquarters. This is one 
characteristic of SOF to which GPF can make no claim. GPF personnel do not 
receive adequate training to operate in such environments, nor are they capable 
of independent operations for extended periods of time, even (and perhaps 
especially) if they are organized into small units, such as TTs. 
A small minority advocates the establishment of a permanent, specially 
trained “Advisor Corps” to conduct the Army’s portion of SFA missions.205 This 
corps would be manned by personnel culled from GPF units, in something of an 
extension of the TT concept currently employed in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
However, rather than advisor duty being a short-term (and possibly one-time, 
which most TT assignments currently are) commitment, most soldiers would 
serve a three year tour in the Advisor Corps (only one year of which would be 
spent advising partner nation forces), then return to a GPF unit. Other soldiers 
would remain in the Advisor Corps to serve as mentors for new advisors and 
doctrine writers.206 However, according to the template Nagl recommends, this 
unit would assume a structure similar to a standing corps, consisting of 20,000 
soldiers, as well as having a lieutenant general as its commander, and three 
major generals to command its divisions, which would be the standard 
deployable unit within the organization.207 Although this would alleviate the ad 
hoc (if not haphazard) way in which advisory teams have heretofore been 
established, it would also require the dedication of 20,000 soldiers, out of an 
authorized active duty strength of 569,400.208 Nagl acknowledges that the 
establishment of such an Advisor Corps would require the sacrifice of four 
Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). He argues, however, that “an advisor command 
dedicated solely to the mission of raising, training, employing, and sustaining 
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host-nation security forces that can defend freedom abroad” more closely 
represents “the Army our country needs now.”209 However, while the U.S. military 
must undoubtedly remain prepared to conduct large-scale advisory efforts for the 
foreseeable future, it must also maintain units capable of executing their 
traditional missions, because we cannot afford to focus to exclusively on one 
type of mission over the other. Given the robust requirements to resource and 
conduct advisory efforts around the world, the U.S. military must develop a 
professional—and more importantly a competent—advisory capability. However, 
we cannot afford to shift the focus of brigade combat teams (BCTs) to a purely 
advisory role, at the expense of their collective competency in their traditional 
roles.  
Joint doctrine prescribes that “Both conventional and SOF units have a 
role and capability to conduct FID missions. ARSOF’s primary role in this 
interagency activity is to assess, train, advise, and assist HN military and 
paramilitary forces with the tasks that require their unique capabilities.”210 Since 
SOF possess unique capabilities, it is arguable that they should not be employed 
for missions that do not require these capabilities. However, neither should 
General Purpose Forces (GPF) be considered the default force for SFA 
missions, since their strengths still lie in more conventional tasks. 
Although the tempo and nature of U.S. operations over the last several 
years has highlighted the need for GPF to play an increased role in advising 
partner nation security forces, it is equally clear that GPF cannot take the place 
of SOF in conducting such tasks, despite the relative scarcity of available SOF. 
The training SF soldiers and units receive makes them particularly (and 
sometimes uniquely, depending on conditions in the operating environment) 
qualified to conduct advisory missions. In order for GPF personnel and units to 
be adequately trained and qualified to conduct advisory missions, more stringent 
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selection processes must be established. Furthermore, although GPF personnel 
assigned to advisory missions need not receive SOF training, the training they do 
receive in preparation for advisory deployments must be modified to emphasize 
not “warrior skills,”211 but advisor skills.  
From an organizational perspective, a standing organization—regardless 
of purpose—would likely produce better results than an ad hoc organization 
established in response to an emergency. The advisory effort in El Salvador was 
undoubtedly enhanced by the fact that OPATT members served multiple tours 
there. Although this repetition at least contributed to the success of that mission, 
it would be a mistake to use it as a basis for establishing a permanent advisor 
corps. Furthermore, establishing a permanent Advisor Corps would entail too 
great a cost in terms of readiness, because of the significant impact it would have 
on the ability of the Army to maintain proficiency at its traditional tasks. Although 
still ad hoc, the current TT model may be the most effective method to conduct 
the military aspects of SFA while maintaining the overall readiness of the Army to 
conduct conventional missions. However, a significantly more stringent screening 
and selection process—similar to that currently employed for Special Forces 
candidates—must be undertaken before soldiers are assigned advisory duties.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study has been to show that United States Security 
Force Assistance (SFA) to partner nations is necessary to achieve the national 
security objectives of the United States. However, such efforts must be 
approached with certain conditions and criteria in mind. Based on recent 
operations, and the emergence of non-state actors as global threats, we are 
currently in an era of “persistent conflict.”212 Therefore, although the scope of 
U.S. SFA requirements will undoubtedly be reduced after U.S. involvement in 
Afghanistan is complete, we must remain prepared to execute similar operations 
in support of shaping operations in other partner nations, to prevent the necessity 
of becoming involved in long-term SFA commitments in those countries.  
Although SOF are the only military forces required by law to conduct 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID), the role of General Purpose Forces (GPF) in 
assistance missions has necessarily grown exponentially in the last several 
years, and each of the Services was recently directed the capability to conduct 
FID. Despite the ongoing debate over the differences between SFA and FID, the 
distinction between the two terms is an arbitrary one, which causes more 
confusion than clarification. Although the two missions were developed 
independently (and although FID is a more established, recognizable term), FID 
is actually a specific type of SFA, employed under certain conditions in pursuit of 
specific goals.  
The U.S. military clearly needs to develop greater capacity to conduct 
Security Force Assistance. Special Operations Forces—despite their success in 
El Salvador and the Philippines—simply do not exist in sufficient quantity to fulfill 
all of the advisory requirements with which the U.S. can expect to be confronted 
in the future. However, merely re-tasking GPF to conduct advisory duties will not 
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imbue them with the capability to adequately perform these functions, especially 
in denied or politically sensitive areas. Furthermore, increasing the number of 
missions for which GPF units must be prepared will likely reduce their 
competency in all of their assigned tasks. Requiring GPF units to focus on tasks 
beyond those for which they are designed and equipped will only dilute their 
ability to perform their doctrinal missions. Although GPF require additional 
training to conduct SFA operations, the U.S. cannot afford to establish a separate 
advisory corps to carry out such missions. 
Regardless of where U.S. forces are sent to conduct SFA, and the type of 
forces we employ to do so, it is imperative to conduct a thorough, honest 
assessment of not only the security situation, but also the challenges and 
limitations of the partner nation government, prior to initiating an assistance 
mission. United States assistance to El Salvador during the 1980s and early 
1990s is often cited as one of our most successful assistance missions. Although 
there were several factors that contributed to this success, the emphasis placed 
on conducting an assessment of El Salvador’s government and military forces, 
and on making U.S. assistance dependent on their performance in such areas as 
human rights, was critical in securing that success. Furthermore, although this 
effort evolved over time in response to changing tactical and operational 
conditions, there was significantly more continuity of effort than we have seen in 
more recent assistance efforts. In Afghanistan, no such initial assessment was 
made prior to the initiation of SFA operations, which has undermined the 
continuity of effort, and U.S. assistance was never tied to the conduct of the 
GIRoA, which has allowed questionable conduct—which may be undermining 
success there—to occur unchecked.  
Legitimacy is a necessary condition for SFA efforts to be successful, but it 
is not sufficient by itself. United States assistance to El Salvador was successful 
in large part because of the perceived legitimacy of not only the presence of U.S. 
forces in the eyes of the Salvadoran people, but also because of the increasing 
legitimacy of the Government of El Salvador, as viewed by the people of El 
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Salvador and the international community. The former was aided by the low 
signature of U.S. forces in El Salvador, and the limited role they played in the civil 
war, including the official prohibition on their participation in actual combat 
operations. The latter was aided by the U.S. making its continued assistance to 
El Salvador contingent on observable improvements in human rights and other 
areas. The problems the U.S. is facing now in Afghanistan are largely a result of 
the perceived lack of legitimacy not only of the GIRoA, but of the presence of 
U.S. troops in Afghanistan. The Government of El Salvador, despite having 
problems of its own, was recognized as a legitimate sovereign power before the 
arrival of U.S. forces. Conversely, the U.S. removed the Taliban from power in 
Afghanistan, and ostensibly installed the GIRoA leadership, which may make the 
continued presence of U.S. forces there suspect in the eyes of the public. 
Although the Taliban did not enjoy international recognition, because of its record 
of atrocities, the GIRoA, although its transgressions are far less egregious than 
the Taliban’s, is not being held accountable, either to its U.S. and NATO 
benefactors or to its own constituency, the Afghan people. 
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